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1 Introduction
The liberalization of the European electricity markets has a number of consequences.
First, the shift away from government-controlled monopolist regimes results in the
need to rethink how to ensure security of supply. A possible approach lies in em-
ploying capacity mechanisms to ensure adequate generation capacity. However, the
need for such mechanisms is a rather controversial topic currently being discussed
by policymakers as well as researchers.
The arguments in favor of the necessity of capacity mechanisms are mainly based
on the specific behavior of electricity markets: Electricity markets are often charac-
terized by a fluctuating price-inelastic demand and limited storage possibilities for
electricity, resulting in high volatility of prices and the ability for players to exercise
market power. Thus, in order to prevent the exercise of market power, price caps (or
related measures) are being discussed or have already been implemented in many
liberalized markets. Binding price caps, however, reduce (spot market) revenues
and may therefore lead to insufficient investments in new generation capacities in
the long term. This problem is known as the “missing money problem”.
The market design debate concerning capacity mechanisms motivates Chapter 2.
In this chapter, the impact of price caps and capacity mechanisms on the market
structure is analyzed. Many electricity markets consist of one or a small group
of large incumbent firms, often former monopolists, who competes with a large
number of small competitive new market entrants. We investigate such markets
by using a theoretical model in which dominant firms face a competitive fringe of
small firms that can freely enter the market and act as price takers. In static models,
lower price caps have the effect of reducing the potential to exercise market power.
We show that in our dynamic model with endogenous investments, lower price
caps result in an increase in market concentration, a higher frequency of capacity
withholding and larger profits for the dominant firms.
In the European countries, market design questions regarding capacity mechanisms
are typically dealt with on a national basis. However, in a liberalized market frame-
work, the opening of national electricity markets into a larger Internal Energy Mar-
ket creates a need to investigate cross-border effects as the choice of capacity mech-
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anism can affect neighboring countries.
Chapter 3 addresses this issue by analyzing the cross-border effects of different ca-
pacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. For the analysis of cross-border effects,
we consider a model defined by two connected countries that only differ in the reg-
ulators’ choices on capacity mechanisms, namely strategic reserves and capacity
payments. Strategic reserves are generation capacities procured and controlled by
a regulator and reserved for cases of capacity scarcity, i.e., strategic reserves are
withheld from the market. Capacity payments are fees that are paid for genera-
tion capacity; the fees can be quantified by a regulator or, alternatively, determined
in capacity markets in which the target capacity is fixed. In contrast to strategic
reserves, capacity payments do not limit the participation in the market. In both
countries, competitive firms can freely enter the market, invest in generation capac-
ities and sell electricity on the spot market. Market equilibria are determined, and it
is shown that different capacity mechanisms lead to redistribution effects such that
the country with strategic reserves is worse off; the consumers’ costs are higher in
this country.
The liberalized electricity market also impacts the realization of policy objectives
such as an increase in the share of electricity generation from renewable energies.
Until now, fluctuating renewable energy technologies have benefited from support
mechanisms (e.g., by fixed feed-in-tariff systems) in order to give incentives for
investing. However, there may at some point be a fully integration of renewables in
the market. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to understand the interaction
between renewable energy generation and electricity markets.
The need to understand the interrelation between renewable energies and electric-
ity spot markets is the motivation for Chapter 4. In this chapter, we analyze the
value of wind power and, more specifically, the impact of the spatial dependencies
of wind power on its market value. Wind power has been growing significantly dur-
ing the last decade and increasingly affects electricity spot prices: Since its marginal
generation costs are close to zero, wind power replaces other generation technolo-
gies when the wind blows and hence leads to generally lower spot market prices.
Furthermore, prices become more volatile due to the stochastic nature of wind.
However, it is clear that the market value of a specific wind turbine depends on
whether it produces when other turbines also produce or, in contrast, generates
electricity when production from wind power is generally low. In this chapter, we
create a stochastic simulation model for electricity spot prices that captures the full
spatial dependence structure of wind power by using copulas. We then calibrate
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the model to German data. It is shown that the specific location of a turbine, i.e.,
its spatial dependence with respect to the aggregated wind power in the system,
is very important for its value. Many of the locations analyzed show an upper tail
dependence that adversely impacts the market value.
The three chapters address different research questions that require different method-
ologies. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with market design issues. In both studies, we an-
alytically derive market equilibria and analyze comparative statics. In Chapter 2,
in addition to competitive firms, strategic players are considered and hence game
theoretical methods are employed, while in Chapter 3 all players are assumed to
be competitive. Chapter 4 constitutes a quantitative analysis on the value of wind
power. For this analysis, we apply econometric methods. More precisely, we intro-
duce copulas and develop a stochastic simulation model.
The remaining part of the introduction consists of the extended abstracts to provide
a non-technical overview of the three papers presented in this thesis.
Chapter 2: Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure (based on
Elberg and Kranz (2014))
In this chapter, the impact of price caps and capacity mechanisms on the market
structure is analyzed, as specified by the market shares, the profits of dominant and
competitive firms as well as the frequency of capacity withholding. The chapter
is based on the working paper by Elberg and Kranz (2014) to which both authors
contributed equally.
For our analysis we choose a model with a fluctuating price-inelastic electricity de-
mand, where a (strategically operating) dominant firm faces a competitive fringe of
small firms that can freely enter the market and act as price takers. In the first
stage, firms invest in capacity and than, in a second stage, sell electricity on the spot
market.
The regulator imposes a spot market price cap, defines the security of supply target
and procures the corresponding capacity in a (descending-bid) capacity auction that
yields a uniform capacity payment (per capacity unit) to each firm providing capac-
ity. Afterwards, the firms offer electricity on the spot market on which pricing is as
follows: If the sum of the fringe capacity and the dominant firm’s offered electric-
ity exceeds demand, competition of the fringe firms drives prices down to marginal
generation costs. Otherwise, electricity is considered scarce, and the price rises to
the price cap.
3
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We find the following main result: A reduction of the price cap increases the profits
and the market share of the dominant firm, as well as the frequency of capacity
withholding on the spot market. The intuition for this result is as follows: To earn
higher spot market profits, the dominant firm holds back capacity to increase spot
market prices, thus having on average lower capacity utilization in peak price peri-
ods than the competitive firms. Hence, if the spot market price cap is lowered, then
spot market revenues per capacity unit of the dominant firms are reduced to a lesser
extent than those of the fringe firms. To reach the fixed capacity target, a reduction
in spot market revenues must lead to higher capacity payments from the capacity
auction. Since both the dominant firm and the competitive fringe receive equal ca-
pacity payments per capacity unit, the dominant firm benefits from this revenues
shift from the spot market to the capacity mechanism.
We extend our model in two dimensions. First, we show the robustness of our re-
sult for alternative capacity mechanisms: subsidies and strategic reserves. If capacity
subsidies are paid, the regulator chooses the subsidy level such that the equilibrium
capacities of the dominant firm and the fringe firms sum up to the target capacity
level. The intuition for why our main result also applies to this capacity mechanism
is similar to that of the auction case: The regulator compensates for the reduction in
the price cap by increasing subsidies, which benefits the dominant firm. A compar-
ison of the dominant firm’s profits under capacity auctions and capacity subsidies
shows that the dominant firm earns weakly higher profits under capacity auctions
than under subsidies.
Strategic reserves are generation capacities procured and controlled by a regulator
and are only used in times of scarcity, i.e., if a supply shortage occurs or if the price
exceeds a trigger price (that equals the maximum price in our model). The regulator
procures strategic reserves such that these together with the equilibrium capacities
of the dominant firm and fringe firms sum up to the target capacity level. We show
that for the case of no price cap (i.e., the price rises up to infinity), the dominant
firm’s capacity and profits decrease to zero.
The second extension addresses the case of multiple dominant firms. We show that
our main result holds for the case of multiple dominant firms, namely that the domi-
nant firms market share and profits as well as the frequency of capacity withholding
decrease in the price cap. We prove that in the case of capacity auctions, an equi-
librium exists in which the actions of the dominant firms are “collusive” i.e., the
result for one dominant firm is replicated by an arbitrary (finite) number of domi-
nant firms. Furthermore, we show that this result also carries over for the case of
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capacity subsidies and strategic reserves.
Chapter 3: Cross-Border Effects of Capacity Mechanisms in Electricity Markets
In this chapter, the effects resulting from different choices of capacity mechanisms
in neighboring countries are investigated. I am the sole author of this study, which
has not yet been published.
For the analysis, a model is chosen with two countries, connected by some given
cross-border transmission capacity, that are symmetric in the sense that they face the
same fluctuating price-inelastic electricity demand and ensure the same reliability
level of electricity. In both countries, competitive firms can freely enter the market,
build up generation capacities and sell electricity on the spot market. Both countries
only differ in their capacity mechanisms: strategic reserves or capacity payments.
Strategic reserves are generation capacities procured by a regulator to achieve the
capacity level that corresponds to the target reliability level of electricity. These
capacities are withheld from the market and only used in times of scarcity. Capacity
payments are fees that are paid for capacity to incentivize sufficient investments
in order to meet the predefined capacity target. In contrast to strategic reserves,
capacities that receive capacity payments participate in the spot market.
The spot market prices deviate from the firms’ marginal generation costs only in
times of scarcity, when the high scarcity (maximum) price is reached. Cross-border
trading leads to equal prices in both markets when the transmission capacity is non-
binding; otherwise, the prices in both markets may differ from one another.
Market equilibria are determined and yield the following main result: Although
in isolation both types of capacity mechanisms induce identical costs, in intercon-
nected countries the choice of capacity mechanisms leads to redistribution effects
that leave the country with strategic reserves in a relatively worse position; the
consumers’ costs in this country are higher compared to the country with capacity
payments.
The main effect driving this result comes from the fact that strategic reserves are
only used in case of scarcity. In these situations, prices are high and attract electricity
imports from the other country. Hence, a part of the high payments for electricity
consumption by consumers from the country with strategic reserves leaks to the
other country with capacity payments. The imports reduce the average capacity
utilization and, consequently, the average revenues of the strategic reserves. This
5
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negatively impacts the consumers’ costs in the country with strategic reserves. At
the same time, the additional payments from exporting electricity implicitly benefits
the consumers of the country with capacity payments.
The model is extended to the case of two technologies, base and peak load. It is
shown that the amount of base load technology is independent of whether capacity
mechanisms are introduced. Capacity mechanisms only increase the amount of peak
load technologies. The main result carries over to the case of two technologies: If
the two different capacity mechanisms are introduced in neighboring countries, the
country with strategic reserves is worse off since its consumer costs are higher. In
contrast, the country with capacity payments benefits from this situation.
Chapter 4: Spatial Dependencies of Wind Power and Interrelations with Spot
Price Dynamics (based on Elberg and Hagspiel (2013))
In this chapter, we examine the value of wind power at different locations and,
in particular, how the spatial dependencies of wind power affect its value. This
chapter is based on the working paper by Elberg and Hagspiel (2013); both authors
contributed equally to all aspects of the study.
To investigate the value of wind power, we develop a stochastic simulation model
capturing the spatial dependencies of wind power by using copulas that are incor-
porated into a supply- and demand-based model for electricity spot prices. More
precisely, we model the interrelation between the wind power of a single turbine
at some specific location and the spot market prices for electricity; to this end, we
establish the relationship of the aggregated wind power in the system, to the spot
market prices as well as to the single turbine’s wind power.
In a first step, we develop a supply- and demand-based model for spot prices that
incorporates the aggregated wind power. Since the marginal generation costs of
wind power are close to zero, wind power (if available) replaces generation from
other technologies. We use hourly spot market prices, electricity demand and the
aggregated amount of wind power to establish a functional relationship between
spot prices and the residual demand, defined as the difference of total demand and
wind power. We feed the price process with series of the aggregated wind power
and add a stochastic spot price component in order to account for additional price
movements caused by random events, such as, e.g., unplanned power plant outages.
In a second step, we link the aggregated wind power to the wind power of single
turbines to determine the value of wind power at different locations. To capture the
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entire stochastic dependence structure, we use copulas. With the help of copulas,
we can account for symmetric or asymmetric dependence structures as well as for
no tail, upper or lower tail dependencies.
We calibrate the model with German data since Germany already shows a high
share of wind power in the generation mix. We use hourly wind speeds for many
stations in Germany over a period of more than two decades to derive synthetic
wind power curves describing the electricity generation that the currently installed
wind capacities would have produced in the last decades. With this model, we then
derive the revenue distribution and the market value for a turbine, i.e., the weighted
average spot price that the turbine is able to collect by selling electricity on the spot
market.
We find that taking the complete dependence structure between the aggregated
wind power and a single turbine’s generation into account is indeed necessary;
simply using the correlation coefficient or linear measures would lead to incorrect
conclusions regarding the market value of a turbine. Since many of the stations
analyzed show an upper tail dependence that adversely impacts the market value,
linear measures would systematically overestimate the market value in these cases.
Some of the locations do not show an upper tail dependence and therefore have a
relatively higher market value.
For the 19 stations analyzed in Germany, we find that the expected market value is
up to 8 Euro/MWh lower than the average spot price level of 49.80 Euro/MWh for
the year 2011 and varies by up to 6 Euro/MWh for the different locations.
Furthermore, we investigate the market value of wind power for changing wind
power penetration levels. Our results show that for the case of increasing wind
power penetration levels, the adverse impact of an upper tail dependence structure
could become even more important.
7

2 Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market
Structure
Liberalized electricity markets are characterized by fluctuating price-inelastic de-
mand of non-storable electricity, often defined by a substantial market share held
by one or few incumbent firms. These characteristics have led to a controversial
discussion concerning the need for and the design of capacity mechanisms, which
combine some form of capacity payments with price caps in the spot market. The
purpose of this study is to understand the effects of capacity mechanisms on the mar-
ket structure. We consider a model with dominant firms and a competitive fringe
and investigate the impact of price caps and capacity payments on investment in-
centives and market concentration. While lower price caps reduce the potential for
the exercise of market power in static models, we find that in the dynamic model
with endogenous investments, lower price caps result in an increase in market con-
centration, the frequency of capacity withholding and the profits of the dominant
firms.
2.1 Introduction
The need for and the design of capacity mechanisms have been controversially dis-
cussed during recent years. Researchers as well as policymakers are concerned that
there may not be sufficient investment incentives for adequate generation capacity
on the wholesale market.1 As the European Commission (2012) summarizes, “en-
suring generation adequacy in electricity markets has become an increasingly visible
topic in the policy discussion”.
The reason for the concerns and the subsequent debate about capacity mechanisms
is often based on the following line of argument: Electricity markets are character-
ized by a fluctuating price-inelastic demand and limited storage possibilities, which
can cause high price volatility and facilitate the exercise of market power.2 There-
1See, for example, Joskow (2008), Cramton and Stoft (2005), Finon and Pignon (2008).
2Market power in electricity markets has been studied, for example, by Borenstein et al. (2002) and
Wolfram (1999).
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fore, price caps or related measures are often proposed or are already implemented
to reduce the potential of market power in the spot market. However, binding price
caps reduce spot market revenues and may therefore lead to a lack of investments
in the long term. This problem is often referred to as the “missing money” problem
and is intensively discussed in economic literature, e.g., by Hogan (2005), Cram-
ton and Stoft (2006) or Joskow (2008). For this reason, capacity mechanisms have
been introduced or are currently being debated in many liberalized electricity mar-
kets. Typically, capacity mechanisms consist of some form of capacity payments and
come along with price caps or similar measures to address the missing money and
the market power problems.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of capacity mechanisms on the
market structure. In many electricity markets, the market structure is given by a
small group of large incumbent firms (or a single large firm) which competes with
many small competitive firms. We investigate such markets using a model with
fluctuating price-inelastic electricity demand, in which dominant firms face a com-
petitive fringe of small firms that can freely enter the market and act as price takers.
Investments take place in the first stage, followed by firms selling electricity on the
spot market. We analyze how the level of price caps and capacity mechanisms af-
fect the market structure, specified by the resulting market shares, the profits of the
dominant and competitive firms as well as the frequency of capacity withholding
on the spot market.3 Focus is centered on three common forms of capacity mecha-
nisms: capacity auctions, subsidies and strategic reserve.4
We find the following main result, which holds robustly for different forms of capac-
ity mechanisms: if the price cap decreases, the market share and profits of the dom-
inant firms increase and the frequency of capacity withholding in the spot market
also increases. This means that even though lower price caps reduce the potential
for static market power exertion, there is a robust counter-veiling force such that a
reduction of price caps increases market concentration as long as total capacity is
fixed by a capacity mechanism. The main intuition is as follows: when fixing a target
level of total capacity, a lower price cap means that spot market revenues decrease
3Besides price caps, other control methods to reduce market power and price volatility exist, e.g.,
reliability options or bid caps on the spot market see Cramton and Stoft (2008); Joskow (2008).
All three of these methods lead to a reduction of the generators’ profits in times of scarcity. For
our analysis, only this impact is important; therefore we do not distinguish between the different
methods.
4Capacity markets with capacity auctions have been introduced in many electricity markets in the US
as well as in Central and South America. Examples include the Forward Capacity Market (ISO New
England), the Reliability Pricing Model (PJM) and the Colombia Firm Energy Market. Strategic
reserves are used in Sweden and Finland. Capacity subsidies are paid in Spain and Portugal.
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and a larger fraction of firm revenues must come from the capacity mechanism.
This shift in revenue streams benefits the dominant firms relative to the competitive
fringe for the following reason: in order to raise spot market profits, dominant firms
hold back capacity to increase spot market prices, thus having a lower capacity uti-
lization in peak price periods. As a consequence the average revenue per capacity
on the spot market of the dominant firms is lower than that of the competitive firms.
On the other hand, a dominant firm and a competitive firm benefit equally from the
capacity payments. When fixing a target level of total capacity, a lower price cap
means that energy market revenues decrease and a larger fraction of firm revenues
must come from the capacity mechanism. This shift in revenue streams benefits
the dominant firms relative to the competitive fringe for the following reason: The
dominant firms have on average a lower capacity utilization during peak price pe-
riods due to the fact that they hold back capacity to increase spot market prices.
Therefore, the average revenue per capacity on the spot market of the dominant
firms is lower than that of the competitive firms. On the other hand, a dominant
firm and a competitive firm benefit equally from the capacity payments.
The effects of price caps on investments, market outcomes and market power have
been studied by Zoettl (2011) and Fabra et al. (2011). Zoettl (2011) analyzes the
impact of reduced scarcity prices on investment decisions of strategic firms in base-
load and peak-load technologies. He shows that an appropriately set price cap can
increase investments in peak-load capacity without reducing base-load investments.
Fabra et al. (2011) extend the analysis of Fabra et al. (2006) by analyzing strategic
investment incentives in electricity markets in a duopoly model. They compare
the impact of uniform-price vs. discriminatory auction formats and price caps on
investment incentives. They find that although prices are lower in discriminatory
auctions, the aggregated capacity is the same for both auction formats. Grimm and
Zoettl (2013) analyze strategic investment decisions and compare different spot
market designs. They find that investment incentives decrease if spot markets are
designed in a more competitive fashion. Our main contribution to this literature
is that we explicitly consider capacity mechanisms and their effects on the market
structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, we describe
the model defined by a single dominant firm and a competitive fringe and discuss
the main results for a capacity auction. Section 2.3 illustrates robustness of the
results for different capacity mechanisms. Section 2.4 shows that the results also
apply for multiple dominant firms. Section 2.5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to
11
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the Appendix, Section 2.6.
2.2 The Model
We consider a model with a strategic dominant firm m and a competitive fringe f
consisting of many small firms that act as price takers. There are two stages: In
the first stage, firms perform long-term capacity investments. In the second stage,
firms compete in the electricity spot market, which is characterized by fluctuating
price-inelastic electricity demand.
During the investment stage, the dominant firm and fringe firms build up their ca-
pacities xm ∈ [0, 1] and x f ∈ [0, 1], respectively. The structure of the investment
game varies between the different capacity mechanisms described below. The fixed
costs per unit of capacity (including investment and fixed operation costs) are de-
noted by km and k f . We allow the dominant firm to have a fixed cost advantage due
to expert knowledge or economies of scale, i.e., km ≤ k f .5 Variable per unit costs of
electricity generation are identical for all firms and denoted by c.
2.2.1 Spot Market Behavior
We first describe the spot market and characterize its outcome. Electricity demand is
given by a non-negative random variable D with distribution function G and a con-
tinuously differentiable density function g. There is a maximum level of demand,
which we normalize to 1. We assume that g(D) is strictly positive for all D ∈ [0,1].
One can interpret G as the distribution of demand over a large number of hours in
which spot market competition with given capacities takes place.
After observing realized demand, the dominant firm chooses an output level qm with
qm ≤ xm.6 If the sum of the fringe capacity and the dominant firm’s chosen output
exceeds total demand D, competition by fringe firms will drive the spot market price
down to the variable costs c. Otherwise, electricity is scarce and a maximal price
5Expert knowledge and economies of scale are important factors in electricity markets due to the
very high investment costs and the corresponding risk that needs to be assessed accordingly, i.e.,
for large incumbent firms with power plant portfolios or small new entrants. In addition, the
locational advantage of incumbent firms is of particular importance: Existing power plants can be
extended or replaced by new power plants, which reduces location and infrastructure costs. As
shown below, a strict cost advantage is crucial for the existence of market power in our model with
free entry.
6We would obtain the same results if the dominant firm offered supply functions that specify price-
quantity schedules.
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P¯ > c is reached.7 P¯ corresponds either to a price cap determined by the regulation
or to the value of lost load (VOLL), which indicates the amount that customers are
willing to pay to avoid a power outage. Written compactly, the spot market prices
satisfy
P

qm, x f , D

=
P¯ if D ≥ qm+ x fc if D < qm+ x f . (2.1)
When demand is below the total capacity of the competitive fringe x f , the spot
market price always equals the variable generation costs c. The dominant firm
then cannot influence the price level. When demand exceeds the fringe capacity,
the dominant firm always has an incentive to withhold just enough capacity that
scarcity drives the price up to P¯, i.e. it then optimally chooses
qm = min
¦
D− x f , xm
©
.
For fixed x f , the equilibrium prices on the spot market are therefore independent
of the dominat firm’s capacity xm and given by
P =
P¯ if D > x fc if D ≤ x f . (2.2)
Positive spot market profits are only achieved in periods with a peak price P = P¯. To
avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we restrict attention to the case that x f +xm ≤
1.8 The expected variable spot market profits per capacity unit of the dominant firm
and the competitive fringe are given by
pism =
 
P¯ − c1− G(x f + xm)+ ∫ x f +xm
x f
D− x f
xm
g (D) dD
 (2.3)
pisf =
 
P¯ − c1− G x f  . (2.4)
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we henceforth make
Assumption 1. The maximum spot market markup P¯ − c is strictly larger than the
fringe firm’s fixed cost of capacity k f .
7We assume that if electricity demand exceeds total supply, there is a partial blackout. The network
operator cuts off exactly so many consumers from the electricity supply that total consumption
equals the given supply.
8In our model, there is no need for a regulator to design a capacity mechanism that yields a total
capacity above the maximum demand.
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From Assumption 1 and Equation (2.4), it follows that the competitive fringe builds
a positive capacity x f > 0. We denote the average capacity utilization (capacity
factor) of the dominant firm in periods with peak price by:
φm = ED

qm
xm
D > x f  .
We can then compactly write its expected spot market profits as
pism =
 
P¯ − c1− G x f φm. (2.5)
If fringe capacity is below the maximum demand, there are always some demand
realizations in which capacity withholding is optimal for the dominant firm, which
implies
φm < 1.
In contrast, the fringe firms always utilize their whole capacity in peak price periods.
Hence, while the dominant firm benefits from capacity withholding on the spot
market, a fringe firm benefits even more. We therefore directly find
Proposition 1. If xm > 0 and x f < 1, the dominant firm’s expected spot market
profits per capacity unit are strictly below those of a fringe firm and satisfy
0< pism = φmpi
s
f .
2.2.2 Investments and Capacity Auctions
We assume that the regulator imposes a spot market price cap P¯ but at the same
time wants to ensure a reliability level ρ, which measures the probability that no
blackout takes place due to insufficient supply, i.e.,
ρ ≡ P(D ≤ xm+ x f ).
In our model, fixing a reliability level is equivalent to fixing a total capacity
xT ≡ xm+ x f .
We investigate a market design in which the desired capacity xT is procured in
an auction that yields a uniform capacity payment to each firm that is willing to
provide capacity. Capacity auctions exist in many electricity markets in the USA
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as well as in Central and South America. Examples include the Forward Capacity
Market (ISO New England) and the Colombia Firm Energy Market (see, e.g., Cram-
ton (2006) or Cramton (2007)). We consider a multi-unit descending bid auction.
Ausubel and Cramton (2006) discuss this auction type and its application for ca-
pacity procurement. The auctioneer starts by announcing a high initial capacity
payment (auction price) that is offered for each unit of capacity. At each price level,
firms simultaneously announce the capacities that they are willing to build. The
price is continuously decreased as long as the offered supply of capacity exceeds
the demand for capacity xT .
9 At any given price, firms can at most offer the same
amount of capacity that they had previously offered at a higher price, i.e., offered
capacity levels must weakly decrease during the auction. The resulting uniform ca-
pacity payment will be the infimum of those auction prices at which the capacity
offered was at least as high as capacity demand.10 Consider an auction outcome
with capacities xm, x f and capacity payments z. A fringe firm’s expected profits per
capacity unit, including spot market profits, fixed cost and capacity payments, are
then given by
pi f =
 
P¯ − c1− G x f − k f + z.
Hence, fringe profits are zero whenever fringe capacity and capacity payments sat-
isfy the following relationship
z = k f −  P¯ − c1− G x f  . (2.6)
Consistent with the assumption that fringe firms act as price takers and there is free
entry, we assume that for any offered capacity payment z during the auction, total
fringe supply is such that the zero profit condition (2.6) exactly holds. As capacity
payments decrease during the auction, the offered fringe capacity also decreases.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this zero profit curve as a fringe supply curve for different
capacity payments.
If the dominant firm bids in all rounds some constant capacity xm ∈ [0,1], we
have the following auction outcome: the dominant firm receives the capacity xm,
the fringe capacity is x f = xT − xm and the capacity payments z are determined
by the zero profit curve (2.6). Given the competitive bidding of the fringe firms,
the dominant firm has no alternative bidding strategies that could lead to different
auction outcomes than the simple strategy of bidding a constant xm. This means
9It is a common simplification in theoretical models to assume that prices decrease in a continuous
fashion, even though in real world auctions discrete bid decrements are often used.
10In case of excess supply at this price, capacity is randomly allocated.
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x f
z
1
0
k f
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the fringe capacity as function of capacity payment derived from
the fringe’s zero profit curve
that the dominant firm influences the auction outcome and the resulting capacity
payments in its choice of xm. However, its ability to exert market power in the
auction is limited by the competitive behavior of the fringe who determines the
auction price corresponding to each choice of xm. By substituting the values for z
and x f , the dominant firm’s expected total profits
Πm =

pism+ z− km

xm
=
 
φm
 
xm
− 1 P¯ − c 1− G  xT − xm+ k f − km xm (2.7)
can be written as a function of the desired level of xm. The dominant firm simply
maximizes these profits over xm. Without imposing further (quite strong) assump-
tions on the demand distribution G, the dominant firm’s profit function is not con-
cave in general. This means that the first order condition of zero marginal profits
is not sufficient for an optimal capacity choice, and we cannot rely on the implicit
function theorem for comparative statics. Nevertheless, using methods of mono-
tone comparative statics (Milgrom (2004)), we can establish the following general
result.
Proposition 2. If a fixed total capacity xT is procured in a multi-unit descending bid
auction, the dominant firm’s total profits Πm, its capacity xm and market share, as
well as the frequency of capacity withholding in the spot market decrease if the price
cap P¯ increases.
16
2.2 The Model
g(xT − xm)
fringe capacity dominant firm’s capacity
withhold later
Figure 2.2: Illustrating the effect of a marginal capacity expansion of the dominant firm
Main intuition for why the dominant firm’s profits decrease in the price cap
P¯: Even though at first thought it may seem counter-intuitive that the dominant
firm’s expected profits are decreasing in the price cap, there is a nice economic
intuition for this result. Ceteris-paribus, i.e., holding capacities xm and x f fixed, an
increase in the price cap P¯ increases the spot market profits of both the fringe firms
and the dominant firm. Since the capacity payment z in the auction is determined
by the fringe firm’s zero profit, it adjusts downwards accordingly. This means that
an increase in the price cap P¯ induces a shift in the revenues from the capacity
market to the spot market that is profit-neutral for fringe firms. Recall that the
dominant firm makes lower expected spot market profits per capacity unit than
the competitive fringe since, due to capacity withholding, the dominant firm has
a lower capacity utilization φm < 1 in times of peak prices than fringe firms. On
the other hand, the dominant firm benefits as much per capacity unit from the
capacity payment z as a fringe firm. Hence, a revenue shift from capacity market
to spot market that is profit neutral for fringe firms reduces expected total profits
of the dominant firm. Reversely, a reduction of the spot market price cap P¯ causes
a revenue shift from spot markets to capacity markets that benefits the dominant
firm. This intuition is quite robust: Even if we had elastic electricity demand, the
dominant firm would make lower average profits on the spot market than a fringe
firm and therefore prefer revenue shifts from the spot market to the capacity market.
More detailed intuition: To gain a deeper intuition of Proposition 2, consider the
derivative of the dominant firm’s total profits (2.7) with respect to its constant auc-
tion bid xm, taking all effects into account. It can be compactly written as
11
∂Πm
∂ xm
= (k f − km)− g(xT − xm)(P¯ − c)xm. (2.8)
To interpret this marginal profit function, consider Figure 2.2. Each box illustrates
11See the appendix for a derivation.
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a small capacity unit, with the shaded box indicating the unit which has transferred
from the fringe to the dominant firm in the event the dominant firm marginally
increases its capacity xm. If the dominant firm performs capacity withholding on
the spot market, we assume w.l.o.g. that it first withholds capacity units that are
more to the right in Figure 2.2. Since the newly acquired capacity unit is the last
unit that is withheld, the dominant firm earns approximately the same expected
spot market profit from this unit as the competitive fringe. Given that the fringe
firms’ profits from the last capacity unit are internalized in the capacity payment
z, the dominant firm has a gross benefit from this extra unit equal to its fixed cost
advantage k f − km, which appears as the first term in the marginal profit function.
A marginal increase in the dominant firm’s capacity xm marginally decreases the
fringe capacity x f and therefore increases expected spot market revenues, which
causes capacity payments to fall. This shift from capacity market revenues to spot
market revenues decreases the dominant firm’s total profits due to the intuition
explained above.
This negative impact is captured by the term −g(xT − xm)(P¯− c)xm in the marginal
profit function. To understand this term, consider the case in which realized spot
market demand is just slightly above the new fringe capacity, so that the dominant
firm withholds all its capacity including the newly acquired capacity unit. The den-
sity g(xT − xm) can be interpreted as a measure for the “probability” of this event
occurring. The fringe firms then earn a spot market profit of (P¯− c) per unit, which
they would not have made if the dominant firm had not expanded its capacity. This
increase in fringe firms’ expected spot market profits translates into a lower auction
price, which reduces the capacity payments for all xm inframarginal capacity units
of the dominant firm.
This negative effect in the marginal profit function is ceteris paribus increasing in
the price cap P¯. Intuitively, this is because a higher price cap means that an increase
in the dominant firm’s capacity causes a stronger revenue shift from capacity mar-
kets to spot markets. For this reason the dominant firm’s equilibrium capacity is
decreasing in the price cap P¯.
Necessity of fixed cost advantage for market power: We also see from (2.8) that
it can only be profitable for the dominant firm to build a positive capacity if it has a
fixed cost advantage, i.e. km < k f . Given that a firm with market power gains fewer
spot market profits than a competitive firm, it is clear that market power can only
arise if the dominant firm has a cost advantage.
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Welfare
Proposition 2 has the following implication on total welfare:
Corollary 1. Given completely inelastic demand, total welfare is decreasing in the price
cap P¯.
To understand the result, note that in our model with capacity markets, a higher
market share of the dominant firm corresponds to a larger welfare level. This is
because of the following reasons:
i) The total capacity xT , and thus the frequency of blackouts, is exogenously
fixed.
ii) The dominant firm has a positive capacity xm > 0 if and only if it has a cost
advantage over the competitive fringe. This means a higher market share of
the dominant firm implies lower total costs of electricity production.
iii) Due to the perfectly inelastic electricity demand, there are no deadweight
losses from the capacity withholding of a dominant firm.
On the other hand, our assumption of perfectly inelastic electricity demand is a sim-
plification rather than an exact description of reality. In reality, some deadweight
losses from capacity withholding are very plausible, which would lead to ambigu-
ous welfare results. Ambiguous welfare results could also result if we maintain
the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand but extend the model to account for
uncertainty in predicted electricity demand. If the dominant firm underestimates
demand, capacity withholding may cause blackouts or require excessive procure-
ment of balancing energy from network operators. Corollary 1 illustrates, however,
that an increase in market concentration is not necessarily connected to a reduction
in welfare.
2.3 Alternative Capacity Mechanisms
This section studies the robustness of our results by considering two alternative
capacity mechanisms: subsidies and strategic reserves.
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2.3.1 Subsidies
Assume that before investments take place, the regulator fixes a uniform capacity
subsidy s to encourage sufficient capacity levels. The regulator fixes a price cap P¯
and chooses the subsidy such that the resulting equilibrium capacity x∗f and x∗m add
up to a target level of total capacity xT .
The total profits per unit of capacity for a fringe firm are given by
pi f = pi
s
f − k f + s. (2.9)
We assume that fringe firms enter the market until profits are driven down to zero.
This zero profit condition can be written as
s = k f −  P¯ − c1− Gx∗f  . (2.10)
For s < k f , this condition uniquely determines the fringe capacity x
∗
f , which is
increasing in the per unit subsidies s. The fringe’s equilibrium capacity does not
depend on the dominant firm’s capacity xm. This is because the dominant firm
always withholds sufficient capacity to drive prices up to P¯ when D > x∗f . Therefore
the frequency of high prices (P = P¯) only depends on the fringe’s capacity and the
distribution of demand. Consequently, it does not matter whether the dominant
firm invests before, at the same time or after the competitive fringe: the resulting
equilibrium capacities are the same. The dominant firm’s expected profits are given
by
Πm =

pism+ s− km

xm. (2.11)
The dominant firm’s equilibrium capacity x∗m maximizes total profits Πm, given the
fringe’s equilibrium capacity x∗f and the previously fixed subsidy s. In contrast to
the auction, the capacity payments are no longer a function of the dominant firm’s
capacity choice. The dominant firm’s first order condition for an interior solution is
given by
∂Πm
∂ xm

x∗m

=
 
P¯ − c1− Gx∗f + x∗m−  km− s= 0. (2.12)
The term km−s simply describes the net cost of an additional capacity unit. The term 
P¯ − c1− Gx∗f + x∗m captures the effect of a marginal capacity expansion on
spot market profits. In situations in which demand exceeds the total capacity, the
additional marginal unit is sold with a markup of P¯ − c.
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Independent of the form of the demand distribution G, the dominant firm’s expected
profits are strictly concave in xm. Hence, the fringe’s zero profit condition and the
dominant firm’s first order condition uniquely determine equilibrium investments
for any given pair of subsidies s and price cap P¯. It follows from (2.12) that for
any fixed total capacity xT < 1, the subsidies s must increase if the price cap P¯
decreases. In the special case of a 100% reliability level, i.e., xT = 1, subsidies must
always be equal to the dominant firm’s fixed cost km.
12
Even though the dominant firm’s first order condition is quite distinct from the one
in the auction case, we find qualitatively the same comparative static results with
respect to the price cap.
Proposition 3. If the regulator uses subsidies s to fix a reliability level ρ ∈ [0,1],
the dominant firm’s total profits Πm, its capacity xm and market share, as well as
the frequency of capacity withholding in the spot market decrease if the price cap P¯
increases.
The intuition for this result is similar to that in the auction case. The regulator must
compensate a reduction in the price cap by a higher subsidy level. The dominant
firm benefits from the shift in spot market revenues to capacity subsidies since it has
a lower capacity utilization at peak prices than fringe firms.
Comparison of dominant firm’s profit under capacity subsidies and capacity
auctions
While the competitive fringe’s zero profit conditions for the auction and subsidy
case are basically identical, the dominant firm’s first order conditions differ. We can
generally establish
Proposition 4. For a given price cap P¯ and desired total output xT , the dominant firm
earns weakly higher profits under a capacity auction than under capacity subsidies.
The intuition is as follows: The dominant firm can replicate the profits by simply
bidding the equilibrium quantity under capacity subsidies in the auction. However,
since its first order conditions differ, it generally has more profits under the capacity
auction.
12Yet, for s = km, the dominant firm is indifferent between all capacity levels. Clearly, an auction is
advantageous for targeting a specific capacity goal.
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While we can generally rank the two mechanisms based on the the dominant firm’s
expected profits, ranking based on the dominant firm’s market share and the fre-
quency of capacity withholding is subject to the distribution of demand and the total
capacity level. For the special case of uniformly distributed demand, the outcomes
under an auction and subsidies are equivalent, as we will discuss in Subsection
2.3.3.
2.3.2 Strategic Reserves
Strategic reserves are generation capacity controlled by a regulator and are only
used in the case of a supply shortage or when spot market prices rise above a pre-
viously determined trigger price. In some liberalized electricity markets, strategic
reserves exist in addition to the wholesale market.13 The strategic reserves can be
used to implement a desired reliability level without using capacity payments. As-
sume the trigger price of the strategic reserve is equal to the price cap P¯ and the
regulator procures a strategic reserve of size xr that satisfies xr + x∗f + x∗m = xT
for a specified total capacity level. The strategic reserve is only used in the case of
shortage and does not push prices below the cap P¯, i.e.,
qr =min
¦
xr ,max
¦
0, D− x f − qmm
©©
.
Given this usage policy, the strategic reserve then has no influence over the distribu-
tion of spot market prices. Correspondingly, the equilibrium investments and profits
of the dominant firm and the competitive fringe are independent of the size of the
strategic reserve. The equilibrium capacities x∗m and x∗f are given by the solution of
the zero profit condition (2.10) and the first order condition (2.12) of the previous
subsection for the case of a zero subsidy s = 0. In particular, the fringe firms’ ca-
pacity does not depend on the dominant firm’s capacity. We find the following limit
result for changes in the price cap.
Proposition 5. Consider an electricity market with strategic reserves and the limit
P¯ → ∞. The equilibrium capacities of the dominant firm and the competitive fringe
then satisfy x f → 1 and xm→ 0.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows: The frequency of high prices P = P¯
only depends on the fringe’s capacity and on the distribution of demand. Therefore,
the higher the maximal price P¯, the higher the expected spot market profits of the
13For example, strategic reserves exist in Sweden and Finland.
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fringe firms and the higher the equilibrium capacity x∗f . The dominant firm faces
countervailing effects: On the one hand, a higher maximal price P¯ leads to higher
spot market profits if demand exceeds the fringe’s capacity. On the other hand, the
fringe’s capacity is increasing in P¯ and therefore reduces the frequency of high prices
and the dominant firm’s average share in production if prices are high. In contrast to
the previously discussed capacity mechanisms, there is no shift in revenues from the
spot market to a capacity market if P¯ decreases. Hence, it is not clear as to whether
the dominant firm’s expected spot market profits as well as its equilibrium capacity
are increasing or decreasing in P¯. However, the limit result holds true since the
fringe’s capacity is strictly increasing in P¯ and there is no incentive to build capacity
greater than the maximal demand (i.e., x∗f + x∗m ≤ 1).
2.3.3 Equivalent Equilibrium Outcomes under Uniformly Distributed
Demand
Interestingly, for the special case of uniformly distributed demand, fixed total capac-
ity xT and price cap P¯, we find that the dominant firm’s equilibrium capacity and
expected profits are the same under all three capacity mechanisms:
x∗m =
k f − km
P¯ − c and Π
m

x∗m

=

k f − km
2
2
 
P¯ − c . (2.13)
The dominant firm’s equilibrium capacity is then independent of the total capacity
xT and simply given by the ratio of the fixed cost advantage to the difference in
price cap and variable costs. Furthermore, fringe capacity and the distribution of
spot market prices are the same for capacity auctions and subsidies. Under strategic
reserves, fringe capacity is generally lower, however, and replaced by reserve capac-
ity. Consequently, under strategic reserves, there is a larger fraction of periods in
which the spot price peaks. This result does not necessarily extend to more general
demand functions, however.
Entry Barriers
Free entry by competitive firms substantially limits the dominant firm’s scope of
market power. The dominant firm may attempt to restrict the competitive pressure
by building entry barriers. In this subsection, we analyze how the dominant firm’s
incentive to build entry barriers by raising the fringe firms’ fixed costs depends on
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the spot market price cap. See Salop and Scheffman (1983) and Salop and Scheff-
man (1987) for a classical treatment on raising rivals’ costs. Assume that at an initial
stage, the dominant firm can pick an intensity level b ∈ 0, b¯ of anti-competitive
practices and the resulting fringe firm’s fixed costs are given by
k f = km+∆+ b.
The parameter ∆ measures a natural fixed cost benefit of the dominant firm. For
simplicity, we assume that demand is uniformly distributed and that the dominant
firm has quadratic costs of anti-competitive practices
ψ (b) = γb2.
The dominant firm’s total expected profits as a function of the sabotage intensity
then satisfy
Πm

x∗m

=

(∆+ b) 2
2
 
P¯ − c − γb2

.
By solving for the optimal level of b, we directly find the following result:
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the intensity of anti-competitive practices b to build
entry barriers is decreasing in the price cap; i.e., the incentive to build entry barriers is
reduced.
The intuition is as follows: A higher price cap causes a revenue shift from the ca-
pacity market to the spot market, reducing the expected profits that the dominant
firm can reap from a fixed cost advantage. Therefore, the dominant firm has less
incentive to gain such a cost advantage by raising rivals cost.
2.4 Multiple Dominant Firms and a Competitive Fringe
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our insights for the case with n domi-
nant firms, indexed by i = 1, ..., n, and a competitive fringe f . Again, all firms face
the same variable cost c per unit of capacity and the dominant firms have weakly
lower per unit fixed costs than the fringe firms, i.e., km ≤ k f . In this extension, we
restrict attention to the case in which electricity demand D is uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. We establish that for the case of uniform demand, the joint market shares
and profits of all dominant firms, capacity payments and distribution of market
prices are independent of the number of dominant firms n. This means that our
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comparatively static results of the main model carry over to the case of multiple
dominant firms.
2.4.1 Spot Market Behavior
In the first step, we analyze the production choices on the spot market for a given
vector of capacities x =

x1, .., xn, x f

and realized demand D. Since the maximal
demand level is normalized to 1, we restrict our analysis to the interesting case that
x f + Xd ≤ 1, with Xd := ∑nj=1 x j . In order to simplify the exposition, we assume
w.l.o.g. that dominant firms are sorted increasingly in their capacities, i.e., x1 ≤
x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn. All dominant firms simultaneously choose their spot market outputs
qi ∈ [0, x i] and fringe firms act as price takers. We denote the resulting output
vector by q =

q1, ..., qn, q f

, the output of all dominant firms by Qd :=
∑n
i=1 qi and
the total output by Q := Qd + q f . As before, the spot market price as a function of
Q and D is given by
P(Q, D) =
P¯ if Q ≤ Dc otherwise.
If the demand is below the total capacity of the fringe firms, i.e., D ≤ x f , the perfect
competition of the fringe drives down prices to marginal cost c. Consider the case
D > x f . Since demand is perfectly inelastic, each dominant firm would always
find it profitable to unilaterally reduce its output qi such that total output satisfies
Q = D and spot market prices jump to the price cap P¯. Consequently, there remains
a unique equilibrium spot market price that is determined in the same fashion as
for a single dominant firm (see equation 2.2). However, there is a multitude of
spot market equilibria that differ by the distribution of capacity withholding among
dominant firms: If demand exceeds the fringe’s capacity, D > x f , then all (and only
those) feasible output vectors q =

q1, ..., qn, x f

for which dominant firms’ total
output satisfies Qd = min
¦
D− x f , Xd
©≡Q∗d constitute a spot market equilibrium.
Since we consider our perfectly inelastic demand function as an approximation only
for very inelastic demand functions, it seems sensible to pick equilibrium quanti-
ties that correspond to the limit of equilibria quantities from a sequence of elas-
tic demand functions converging to our inelastic demand function. We define the
capacity-constrained, symmetric distribution of the dominant firms’ total output
Q∗d > 0 as the unique vector q∗d = (q∗1, ...,q∗n) that satisfies the following conditions.
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The first l ∈ {1, ..., n} dominant firms that are capacity constrained produce
q∗i = x i for i = 1, ..., l.
The remaining firms that are not capacity-constrained split the remaining excess
demand equally, i.e.,
q∗i =
D− x f −∑lj=1 x j
n− l for i = l + 1, ..., n.
In Cournot models with a smooth and (possibly just slightly) elastic inverse demand
function and common constant marginal cost, equilibrium outputs usually distribute
total output in such a symmetric fashion.14 Correspondingly, we find the following
result:
Lemma 1. Fix D > x f and consider any sequence of continuously differentiable con-
cave inverse demand functions

P l (Q)

l∈N that converges to our inelastic inverse de-
mand function. Then the corresponding sequence

qld

l∈N of dominant firms’ equilib-
rium output vectors converges to the symmetric output vector q∗d .
In light of this result, we base the subsequent analysis on the following assumption:
Assumption 2. If D > x f , the spot market equilibrium with the capacity-constrained
symmetric output vector q∗ = (q∗1, ...,q∗n, x f ) is selected.
2.4.2 Investments in Capacity
In this subsection, we prove that our comparative static results of the main model
carry over to the case of multiple dominant firms.
Capacity Auctions
Assume the regulator procures the total capacity x T = Xd + x f in a multi-unit de-
scending bid auction. Let x∗m be the equilibrium capacity of a monopolistic firm and
let z∗ be the resulting capacity payment. The bidding function x f (z) of the fringe is
14See, e.g., Zoettl (2011). For the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium: If an inverse demand function
P l (Q, D) is twice continuously differentiable in Q and the first and second derivatives are negative,
then the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is unique and symmetric. See, e.g., Vives (2001), pp.
97/98.
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determined by its zero profit condition
z = k f −  P¯ − c1− x f  . (2.14)
Let z0 be the lowest capacity payment at which it would still be profitable for a
monopolist to offer a capacity of xT − x f (z) instead of stopping to bid and letting
the auction fail.
Consider the following symmetric bidding strategy of the n dominant firms in the
descending bid auction:
x∗ (z) =

1
n
x∗m if z ≥ z∗
1
n

xT − x f (z)

if z0 ≤ z ≤ z∗
0 if z < z0
The first line states that all firms start bidding one n’th of the equilibrium quantity
of a monopolistic firm, causing the auction to end with a resulting auction price of
z∗ and a total capacity of the dominant firms of nx∗(z∗) = x∗m. The other two lines
are mainly important to correctly specify the behavior of off the equilibrium path in
order to have a subgame perfect equilibrium in the descending bid auction: If an
auction price z < z∗ were to be reached in the descending bid auction, firms would
immediately finish the auction by offering the total capacity nx∗ (z) = xT − x f (z).
Even if an auction price below z0 were to be reached, the dominant firms would
stop bidding and the auction would fail.
Proposition 7. The symmetric bidding strategies x∗(z) form a symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in the descending bid auction with multiple dominant firms. The
equilibrium auction price z∗, the total capacity and the total profits of all dominant
firms are independent of the number of dominant firms n and equal to the results for
a monopolistic firm.
A rough intuition for this result is that the completely inelastic demand causes the
oligopolistic dominant firms to act in the same fashion as a monopolistic dominant
firm. For a more detailed insight, we refer the reader to the proof in the Appendix.
Subsidies and Strategic Reserve
Assume the regulator fixes a uniform capacity subsidy s such that the resulting equi-
librium capacities X ∗d =
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i and x
∗
f add up to the target level x
T . The fringe’s
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capacities do not depend on the dominant firms’ capacity because spot market prices
rise up to P¯ whenever D > x∗f . For s < k f , the fringe’s equilibrium capacities x∗f are
therefore uniquely determined by the zero profit condition:
s = k f −  P¯ − c1− x∗f  .
The dominant firms choose their equilibrium capacities x∗d =

x∗1, ..., x∗n

to maxi-
mize their profits for given fringe capacities x∗f and previously fixed subsidies s. We
find the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For fixed capacity subsidies s, the total equilibrium capacities as well as
the total profits of all dominant firms are independent of the number of dominant firms
and equal to the equilibrium capacities x∗m and profits Πm

x∗m

for a monopolistic
dominant firm. Furthermore, the equilibrium capacities and profits of the dominant
firms are symmetric.
Let us consider a market in which the regulator procures a strategic reserve to obtain
the total capacity level x T = xr + X ∗d + x∗f . As in subsection 2.3.2, the strategic
reserve is only used in times of shortage and does not influence the distribution of
spot market prices. This means that the equilibrium capacities of the dominant firms
and the competitive fringe are the same as in the previously considered market but
with zero subsidies, i.e., s = 0. Since the dominant firms’ equilibrium capacities are
independent of the total capacity xT (and s) see subsection 2.3.3, we directly find
Corollary 2. If the regulator procures a strategic reserve to obtain the total capacity
level x T , the total equilibrium capacities as well as the total profits of all dominant
firms are independent of the number of dominant firms and equal to the equilibrium
capacities and profits for a monopolistic dominant firm. Furthermore, the equilibrium
capacities and profits of the dominant firms are symmetric.
2.5 Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this study to understand the effects of price caps and
capacity mechanisms on the market structure. For our analysis, we have chosen a
model with fluctuating price-inelastic electricity demand in which a dominant firm
faces competitive firms that can freely enter the market and act as price takers.
Firms invest in capacity in the first stage and afterwards sell electricity on the spot
market. We have found the following main result: A higher price cap reduces the
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profits and the market share of the dominant firm, as well as the frequency of ca-
pacity withholding in equilibrium. This result is very robust and we have shown
that it holds true for different types of capacity mechanisms as well as for multiple
dominant firms.
The intuition is as follows: Fringe firms make higher average spot market profits per
capacity unit than a dominant firm since a dominant firm has (on average) a lower
capacity utilization in peak price periods due to the fact that it holds back capacity
to increase spot market prices. In contrast, a dominant firm and a competitive firm
benefit equally from capacity payments. When fixing a target level of total capacity,
a lower price cap means that wholesale market revenues decrease and a larger
fraction of firms’ revenues must come from the capacity mechanism. This shift in
revenue streams benefits the dominant firm relative to the competitive fringe.
The result is quite robust and its intuition has more general implications: First,
dominant firms benefit from policy measures that reduce spot market revenues if
capacity mechanisms exist. A lower price cap is one such measure, although we
would see similar effects with alternative policy interventions. For example, a dom-
inant firm would also benefit from a law that explicitly forbids capacity withholding
on the spot market. Second, even if we had an elastic electricity demand, a domi-
nant firm would have lower spot market profits per capacity unit than a fringe firm
and therefore prefer revenue shifts from the spot market to the capacity market.
Especially in light of the present debate surrounding the future design of electricity
markets, price caps and capacity mechanisms, the results we established are quite
interesting. In this discussion, one should take into account that a reduction of
price caps and the resulting shift in revenues from the spot market to the capacity
market could lead to an increasing market share for the large incumbent electricity
generators. The actual purpose of reducing price caps to reduce the exercise of
market power may fail.
In our analysis, we have focused on the effects of changes in price caps and ca-
pacity payments on the market structure. We only briefly discussed the differences
between the capacity mechanisms with regard to the dominant firms’ market share
and the frequency of capacity withholding in Section 2.3.3. Further research could
address these differences, requiring stronger assumptions on demand. Furthermore,
the model could be extended by adding base-load and peak-load technologies to
investigate whether capacity mechanisms yield efficiency losses or gains in the gen-
eration mix.
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2.6 Appendix
The appendix contains all proofs of the paper. Note that by the assumptions on G
and g, and by the assumption that xm + x f ≤ 1, the profit function Πm  xm, P¯ is
twice continuously differentiable in xm and P¯. The same applies for the profit func-
tions Πl that we use in the proofs of propositions 7 and 8.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We prove this proposition in two steps: In part (i), we show that the dominant
firm’s profits are a decreasing function of the price cap. In part (ii), we prove that
the dominant firm’s equilibrium capacities are a decreasing function of the price
cap. From (ii) it follows immediately that capacity withholding is also decreasing in
the price cap since the total capacity is fixed and therefore the fringe’s equilibrium
capacity is increasing in the price cap.
(i) Profits. By the assumption that the total supply of the competitive fringe for
each capacity payment z is such that its total profits pi f are zero, the equilibrium
capacity payment z∗ has to fulfill the following condition:
z∗ =−pisf + k f .
The dominant firm’s profits are therefore given by
Πm =

pism+ z
∗− km

xm
=

pism−pisf + k f − km

xm
=
− P¯ − c 1− G  xT − xm 1−φm+ k f − km xm.
(2.15)
Taking the first derivative of equation (2.15) with respect to P¯ directly leads to the
following lemma:
Lemma. If the dominant firm’s capacity xm is fixed, Πm is strictly decreasing in P¯.
This lemma does not state that the dominant firm’s total profits are decreasing in
the price cap since generally xm depends on P¯. We consider two different price caps
P¯L and P¯H , P¯L < P¯H . Let
x Lm ∈ ar gmax xmΠm
 
P¯L , xm

xHm ∈ ar gmax xmΠm
 
P¯H , xm

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denote optimal capacity selections of the dominant firm given P¯L and P¯H , respec-
tively. By optimality of xm and the lemma above, the following inequalities hold:
Πm

P¯L , x
L
m
≥ Πm P¯L , xHm> Πm P¯H , xHm .
We have therefore shown that the dominant firm’s total profits Πm are strictly de-
creasing in the price cap P¯.
(ii) Capacities. We show that x∗m is a decreasing function of P¯. The dominant firm’s
profit function is given by
Πm =

pism+ z
∗− km

xm
=
 
P¯ − c xm  1− G  xT+ ∫ xT
xT−xm
 
D− xT + xm g(D)dD!
+ z∗xm− km xm.
(2.16)
The auction price is determined by the fringe’s zero profit condition. Plugging z∗ =
k f −  P¯ − c 1− G(xT − xm) into equation (2.16) leads to
Πm =
 
P¯ − c xm  1− G  xT+ ∫ xT
xT−xm
 
D− xT + xm g(D)dD!
+

k f −  1− G  xT − xm P¯ − c xm− km xm.
The first derivative with respect to xm is then given by
∂Πm
∂ xm
= k f − km− g  xT − xm P¯ − c xm.
By taking the derivative with respect to P¯, we get
∂ ∂Πm
∂ xm∂ P¯
(x) =−g  xT − xm xm < 0
since g > 0. We can apply an analogue of the “Monotone Selection Theorem” to
show that x∗m is a strictly decreasing function of the price cap P¯.
Theorem. (Analogue of the Monotone Selection Theorem) Assume that the function
Πm has strictly decreasing differences (SDD). Then every optimal selection x∗m
 
P¯
 ∈
ar gmax xmΠ
m  xm, P¯ is strictly decreasing in P¯ ∈ [0,∞).15
15For the Monotone Selection Theorem, see Milgrom (2004), p.102. Since Πm (·, ·) is sufficiently
smooth, SSD is equivalent to ∂ ∂Π
m
∂ xm∂ P¯
< 0 for all
 
xm, P¯
 ∈ [0, 1]× [0,∞)
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Proof. Let us fix arbitrary P¯L , P¯H ∈ [0,∞) satisfying P¯L < P¯H . Let us again denote
optimal selections by
x Lm ∈ ar gmax xmΠm
 
P¯L , xm

xHm ∈ ar gmax xmΠm
 
P¯H , xm

Let us assume that x Lm ≤ xHm. We bring this assumption to a contradiction. By
definition of xHm and x
L
m, it holds that
Πm

x Lm, P¯L
≥ Πm xHm, P¯L and Πm xHm, P¯H≥ Πm x Lm, P¯H .
This implies that
Πm

x Lm, P¯L

+Πm

xHm, P¯H
≥ Πm xHm, P¯L+Πm x Lm, P¯H ,
which is equivalent to
Πm

x Lm, P¯L
−Πm x Lm, P¯H≥ Πm xHm, P¯L−Πm xHm, P¯H . (2.17)
However, by assumption x Lm ≤ xHm, the SDD property of Πm yields a contradiction to
(2.17). Hence, x Lm > x
H
m, i.e., x
∗
m is strictly decreasing in P¯.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We prove this proposition in two steps: In part (i), we show that the dominant
firm’s profits are a decreasing function of the price cap. In part (ii), we prove that
the dominant firm’s equilibrium capacities are a decreasing function of the price
cap. From (ii), it follows immediately that capacity withholding is also decreasing
in the price cap since the total capacity is fixed and therefore the fringe’s equilibrium
capacity is increasing in the price cap.
(i) Profits. Due to the competitive fringe’s zero profit condition, subsidies have to
satisfy the following condition:
s∗ = k f −pisf .
The dominant firm’s profits are therefore given by
Πm =

pism+ s
∗− km

xm =

pism−pisf + k f − km

xm.
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For the rest of the proof, we refer to part (i) of the proof of Proposition 2.
(ii) Capacities. We show that x∗m is strictly decreasing in P¯. Due to the dominant
firm’s first-order condition (2.12), subsidies have to satisfy the following condition
s∗ = km−  P¯ − c 1− G(xT ) .
Plugging s∗ into the fringe’s zero profit condition (2.10) leads to
x∗f = G−1

G(xT )− k f − kmP¯ − c

.
Therefore, by adjusting s such that the reliability level ρ and the total capacity xT
are kept constant, we find that x f is an increasing function of P¯ by taking the first
derivative
∂ x∗f
∂ P¯
. Since xT = x∗f +x∗m is kept constant, x∗m is a decreasing function of P¯.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let s∗ be the subsidy that implements the total output xT . Let x∗f and x∗m be the
resulting fringe and dominant firm capacity, respectively. Note that due to the same
zero profit condition, x∗f is also the fringe supply in the capacity auction for an auc-
tion price of z = s∗. Therefore, the dominant firm can replicate the same outcome
in the auction as in the subsidy case by bidding a constant quantity of x∗m in the
auction. The resulting capacity payment is z = s∗, the fringe’s capacity is x∗f and the
dominant firm’s capacity is x∗m.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The equilibrium capacities in a market with strategic reserves are given by the solu-
tion of the zero profit condition (2.10) and the first order condition (2.12) for the
case of a zero subsidy s = 0. For P¯ → ∞, it follows from the fringe’s zero profit
condition that x f → 1. Since x f + xm ≤ 1 and xm ≥ 0, it follows that xm→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
By solving the first order condition
∂Πm
∂ b
=
1
P¯ − c 2 (b+∆)− 2γb = 0
and accounting for corner solutions, we find that the dominant firm’s optimal level
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of anti-competitive practices a∗ is by
b∗ =
 ∆(P¯−c)γ−1 if
 
P¯ − cγ > 1
b¯ otherwise.
The result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Assume D ∈ x f , 1. We consider any sequence P l (Q, D)l∈N in which each item
of the sequence is twice continously differentiable and concave in Q and P l (Q, D)→
P¯ for l →∞. For x1, ..., xn ∈ (0,1), the equilibrium quantities ql∗1 , ..., ql∗n are given
by
ql∗i := ar gmax0≤q˜≤x i ,∑ni=1 qi≤D−x f P l q˜+Q∗−i + x f , D q˜− cq˜ .
Since the inverse demand function is given by P l , which is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and concave, the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is unique and sym-
metric, i.e., ql∗1 = ... = ql∗n .16 We consider the case in which all firms are uncon-
strained. Due to the fact that the equilibrium quantities are symmetric, we have the
following constraint: ql∗i ≤ D−x fn .
We choose ε > 0 and N ∈ N such that ||P l−P¯||< ε for all l ≥ N . With δ := P¯−c > 0,
it follows that 
P l − c q˜ =
≤ (δ+ ε) q˜≥ (δ− ε) q˜
for all l ≥ N and q˜ ∈ [0,1]. The function for which we consider the argmax is there-
fore bounded from above by the linear function with the slope δ+ ε and bounded
from below by the linear function with the slope δ − ε for all q˜ ∈
h
0,
D−x f
n
i
. For
ε sufficiently small, we have δ− ε > 0 and the function for which we consider the
argmax has the maximum in the interval
h
δ−ε
δ+ε
D−x f
n
,
D−x f
n
i
. For ε > 0 sufficiently
small, the quantity is close to
D−x f
n
.
If the first m ∈ {1, ..., n} firms are capacity constrained, the arguments from above
hold true for the remaining n−m unconstrained firms. For the equilibrium quanti-
ties ql∗i , i ∈ {n−m, ..., n}, we then have the following constraint: ql∗i ≤ D−x f −
∑m
j=1 x j
n−m .
16See, for example, Vives (2001), pp. 97/98.
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Proof of Proposition 7.
The number of firms that are capacity constrained is weakly increasing in the de-
mand level D. The critical demand level above which the i’th dominant firm be-
comes capacity constrained on the spot market is given by
D˜i = x f + (n− i) x i +
i∑
j=0
x j ,
where we define x0 := 0. The expected variable spot market profits per capacity
unit of the competitive fringe and a dominant firm l are then given by:
pisf =
 
P¯ − c1− x f 
pisl =
1
x l
 
P¯ − c
 l−1∑
i=0
∫ D˜i+1
D˜i
D− x f −∑ij=0 x j
n− i dD+
∫ 1
D˜l
x l dD
 .
Let x∗ = x∗ (z∗) = 1
n
x∗m. Consider first that after some history with price z > z∗,
firm l would have a profitable deviation in his bidding function that results at an
equilibrium to an auction price zˆ > z∗. The resulting equilibrium output of firm l is
then given by
xˆ = xT − x f (zˆ)− (n− 1)x∗.
Since the fringe firm’s supply is increasing in z, we must have xˆ < x∗. Let
∆= x∗− xˆ ≥ 0
denote the reduction of the deviating firm’s output compared to its equilibrium
output. Since other dominant firms offer a constant amount, the fringe output
under the deviation satisfies
xˆ f = x
∗
f +∆
and the resulting auction price satisfies
zˆ(∆) = k f −  P¯ − c1−x∗f +∆ .
The resulting spot market equilibrium with asymmetric capacities yields the follow-
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ing expected spot market profit for the deviating firm:
(x∗−∆)pˆisl (∆) =
 
P¯ − c∫ x∗f +nx∗−(n−1)∆
x∗f +∆
D−

x∗f +∆

n
dD
+
 
P¯ − c∫ 1
x∗f +nx∗−(n−1)∆
 
x∗−∆ dD.
Firm l ’s expected total profits under this deviation are given by
Πˆl(∆) = (x∗−∆)(zˆ(∆)− kd) + (x∗−∆)pˆisl(∆)
Tedious but straightforward algebra shows that
∂ Πˆl
∂∆
=− P¯ − cn∆,
which is negative for all ∆ ≥ 0. This means that a deviation that yields an auction
price zˆ > z∗ cannot be profitable after any history.
To check that there are no other profitable deviations, let pim(z) denote the profits
of a monopolist who offers the amount xm(z) that leads to an auction price z. This
profit function is strictly concave (at least for uniformly distributed demand) and
maximized at z∗. Recall that for all z ∈ [z0, z∗], the bids of the equilibrium strategies
are given by
x∗ (z) = 1
n
xm (z)
and the resulting profits of each dominant firm are given by 1
n
xm(z). Also, if firm i
performs any deviation xˆ at some history with z ≥ z∗ that yields an auction price
zˆ ∈ [z0, z∗), then firm i’s resulting capacity is always 1n xm(zˆ) and its equilibrium
profits are 1
n
pim(zˆ). Yet, given that pim(z) is maximized for z = z∗, such a deviation
cannot be profitable. Due to the concavity of pim(z), it is also strictly optimal to fol-
low the equilibrium strategy in any continuation equilibrium in which the current
auction price is z ∈ [z0, z∗), i.e., to immediately stop the auction. By the definition
of z0 as the lowest capacity payment under which a monopolist would be willing to
supply xT − x f (z), it is also clear that there can never be a profitable deviation that
leads to an auction price z ≤ z0.
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Proof of Proposition 8.
As already discussed in the proof of Proposition 7, the number of firms that are ca-
pacity constrained is weakly increasing in the demand level D. The critical demand
level above which the i’th dominant firm becomes capacity constrained on the spot
market is given by
D˜i = x f + (n− i) x i +
i∑
j=0
x j ,
where we define x0 := 0. The expected variable spot market profits per capacity
unit of the competitive fringe and a dominant firm l are then given by:
pisf =
 
P¯ − c1− x f 
pisl =
1
x l
 
P¯ − c
 l−1∑
i=0
∫ D˜i+1
D˜i
D− x f −∑ij=0 x j
n− i dD+
∫ 1
D˜l
x l dD
 .
Hence, the dominant firm l ’s total profits are given by
Πl =

pisl + s− km

x l .
The first derivative of the dominant firm l ’s profit function is given by
∂Πl (x)
∂ x l
=
 
P¯ − c
1− x f − (n− l) x l − l∑
j=0
x j
−  km− s .
In part (i), we show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and that the equilibrium
capacities are uniquely determined by
0=
 
P¯ − c1− x f − nx∗−  km− s
(which states that x∗ is exactly 1
n
’th of x∗m). In part (ii), we show the uniqueness of
this result.
(i) Existence. To show the existence of an equilibrium, it is sufficient to show
quasiconcavity of firm l ’s profits Πl

x∗l , x˜−l

, given the symmetric capacities x˜ of
the other dominant firms.17 If all other dominant firms choose a symmetric capacity
17See, for example, Vives (2001) page 16.
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x˜ , then the derivative of l ’s profit function is given by
∂Πl
∂ x l
=

 
P¯ − c1− x f − nx l−  km− s if x l ≤ x˜ 
P¯ − c1− x f − (n− 1) x˜ − x l−  km− s if x l ≥ x˜ .
When other firms choose x˜ = x∗l , then this derivative is zero for x l = x∗l . The
derivative
∂Πl(x l, x˜−l)
∂ x l
is differentiable and
∂ ∂Πl(x l, x˜−l)
∂ x l∂ x l
< 0. Hence, the profit function
is concave in firm l ’s profits (and thus quasiconcave).
(i) Uniqueness. Due to strict concavity, no other symmetric equilibrium exists.
In the following, we show by contradiction that no asymmetric equilibrium exist:
Assume an asymmetric equilibrium exists. In this case, we can order the equilibrium
capacities x∗1 ≤ ... ≤ x∗n, where at least one inequality has to hold strictly, i.e.,
x∗1 < x∗n. The first order condition of firm n is given by
∂Πn (x)
∂ xn
=
 
P¯ − c
1− x f − n∑
j=0
x j
−  km− s .
Obviously ∂
2Πn
∂ x2n
< 0. Therefore firm n’s profit function is concave and any asymmet-
ric equilibrium has to fulfill the condition ∂Π
n
∂ xn
= 0. However, whenever ∂Π
n
∂ xn
= 0
holds, firm 1’s profits are increasing in x1:
∂Π1 (x)
∂ x1
=
 
P¯ − c1− x f − nx1−  km− s
>
 
P¯ − c
1− x f − n∑
j=0
x j
−  km− s= 0.
The inequality holds due to x1 < xn. Therefore, any asymmetric equilibrium cannot
exist.
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in Electricity Markets
To ensure security of supply in liberalized electricity markets, different types of ca-
pacity mechanisms are currently being debated or have recently been implemented
in many European countries. The purpose of this study is to analyze the cross
border effects resulting from different choices on capacity mechanisms in neigh-
boring countries. We consider a model with two connected countries that differ in
the regulator’s choice on capacity mechanism, namely strategic reserves or capacity
payments. In both countries, competitive firms invest in generation capacity before
selling electricity on the spot market. We characterize market equilibria and find the
following main result: While consumers’ costs may be the same under both capacity
mechanisms in non-connected countries, we show that the different capacity mech-
anisms in interconnected countries induce redistribution effects. More precisely,
we find that consumers’ costs are higher in countries in which reserve capacities
are procured than in countries in which capacity payments are used to ensure the
targeted reliable level of electricity.
3.1 Introduction
Ensuring adequate generation capacity to meet high security of supply targets in
liberalized electricity markets is of major concern to many policymakers. To im-
prove security of supply, different forms of capacity mechanisms are currently being
debated or have recently been implemented in many European countries. Capac-
ity mechanisms are mainly chosen on a national basis; however, the implementa-
tion of the Internal Energy Market in Europe has opened up national markets and
induced increasing interdependence, allowing for neighboring countries to be af-
fected by such interventions.1 Therefore, the European Commission (2013) claims:
“Any back-up capacity mechanism should not be designed having only the national
market in mind but the European perspective.”
1In February 2014, the day-ahead market coupling in the North-West region of Europe began cover-
ing 75% of the European power market. Since then, 15 European countries have become closely
interlinked. See, e.g., Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2014).
39
3 Cross-Border Effects of Capacity Mechanisms in Electricity Markets
The need for capacity mechanisms has been controversially discussed in the lit-
erature on electricity market regulation.2 The main arguments for why security of
supply may be endangered in liberalized electricity markets are as follows: First, the
price-inelasticity of the fluctuating electricity demand may cause blackouts if capac-
ity becomes scarce. Second, the specific price volatility in electricity markets and
market rules such as price caps lower the prospect of price signals leading to suffi-
cient investments in capacity. Hence, different capacity mechanisms are intensively
discussed to overcome such imperfections in electricity markets.3 Although capacity
mechanisms take many forms, we merge them into two main groups: strategic re-
serves and capacity payments. Strategic reserves are generation capacities procured
and controlled by a regulator and are only used in times of scarcity. This means
that strategic reserves are withheld from the market and only used in case of supply
shortages or are alternatively bid into the market at a (high) trigger price.4 Capacity
payments are fees that are paid for capacity to ensure sufficient investments. These
fees can either be fixed directly by the regulator or be determined in capacity mar-
kets in which the target capacity is fixed.5 In contrast to strategic reserve capacities,
these capacities participate in the wholesale market.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the cross-border effects of different ca-
pacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. We investigate such effects by con-
sidering a model with two countries, interconnected by some given transmission
capacity, that are symmetric in the sense that both countries face the same fluctuat-
ing price-inelastic electricity demand. Competitive firms can freely enter the market
and invest in generation capacities before selling electricity on the spot market.
Spot market prices deviate from marginal generation costs only in times of scarcity;
however scarcity prices are too low to allow for a full recovery of fixed costs of
that amount of capacities that is necessary to ensure an exogenously determined
reliability level of electricity. To overcome the resulting “missing money problem”,
one country employs strategic reserves, while the other country uses capacity pay-
ments. We find the following main result: Even though in isolation both forms of
capacity mechanisms lead to an efficient generation mix and identical costs in both
2See, for example, Hogan (2005), Joskow (2008) and Cramton and Stoft (2005).
3See, for example, De Vries and Neuhoff (2004), De Vries (2007), Finon and Pignon (2008), Cramton
and Stoft (2008) and Cramton and Ockenfels (2012).
4Strategic reserves are used, for example, in Sweden and Finland.
5Different forms of capacity markets exist. In some capacity markets, the required target capacity is
centrally fixed and procured (e.g., by the regulator) in an auction. The uniform auction price then
corresponds to the capacity payments. Alternatively, suppliers may be obliged to buy certificates
of previously certified generation capacities. In that case, the certificate price corresponds to the
capacity payments. Capacity markets are in a planning stage, for example, in Great Britain, Italy
and France.
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countries, in interconnected countries the different capacity mechanisms result in
redistribution effects such that the country with strategic reserves is worse off. More
precisely, the consumers’ costs are higher in the country with strategic reserves than
in the country that uses capacity payments to ensure the capacity target.
The main intuition for this result is as follows: For a fixed target capacity, firms’ rev-
enue streams to cover total costs must either come from the capacity mechanism or
from the spot market, i.e., any profits that firms earn on the spot market reduce the
amount that consumers need to pay via a capacity mechanism. Capacity payments
do not limit the participation of firms on the spot markets, while strategic reserves
are withheld from the market and only used in times of scarcity. Consider demand
realizations such that demand can be satisfied across both countries, but in doing
so, some - but not all - capacity from the strategic reserves is required. As a result,
prices are high in at least the country with strategic reserves and trigger electric-
ity imports. Hence, a part of the high payments for electricity consumption by the
consumers in the country with strategic reserves is not earned by the country’s own
firms but “leaks” over the other country with capacity payments and contributes to
the financing of the other country’s firms, hence reducing its consumers’ costs.
Investments in capacity in competitive electricity markets and capacity mechanisms
have been studied by Joskow and Tirole (2007) and Borenstein and Holland (2005).
Joskow and Tirole (2007) discuss optimal prices and investments in electricity sys-
tems in which load serving entities can commit to price-contingent rationing con-
tracts with (price-insensitive) retail consumers. They analyze the effects of price
caps, capacity obligations and capacity prices in such markets. They find that price
caps may lead to underinvestment, while capacity obligations in combination with
capacity payments can restore investments. Borenstein and Holland (2005) also
analyze investments in markets in which many consumers face flat-rate prices and
hence do not react to real-time prices. They discuss the effect of capacity subsidies
and demonstrate that they do not lead to the (second-best) market optimum. The
effects of capacity mechanisms on the market structure, i.e., on the market shares of
dominant and competitive firms, have been discussed by Elberg and Kranz (2014).
Similarities to their model are given by the pricing on the spot market and the con-
sideration of free entry in our model; however we only consider competitive firms.
We contribute to this existing literature by analyzing cross-border effects of capacity
mechanisms in competitive electricity markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, we introduce
the model. In Section 3.3 we discuss a simple numerical example to provide some
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basic intuition for key effects of the model. Cross-border effects of capacity mech-
anisms on market equilibria and the distribution of costs are discussed in Section
3.4. In Section 3.5, we show the robustness of the results for the case of two (base
and peak load) technologies. Section 3.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the
Appendix, Section 3.7.
3.2 The Model
We consider a model with two countries A and B that are connected by (exoge-
nously) given cross-border transmission capacity α ≥ 0. In both countries, compet-
itive firms can freely enter the market and invest in generation capacity, anticipat-
ing the price-inelastic fluctuating electricity demand, and thereafter compete in the
electricity spot market.
Firms in countries A and B build up their capacities xA ∈ [0, 1] and xB ∈ [0,1],
respectively. The constant fixed costs per unit of capacity are denoted by k ∈ R+,
and the variable costs of production are given by c ∈ R+.
The electricity demand is given by non-negative random variables DA and DB for
countries A and B, respectively. The joint electricity demand is given by D :=
DA + DB, with the corresponding joint distribution function G and continuously
differentiable density function g. We normalize the random variable D to the unit
interval and assume that g (D)> 0 for all D ∈ [0, 1]. One can think of G as the dis-
tribution of demand over a large period of time in which spot market competition
with given capacities takes place.
Since we want to focus our analysis on the effect of the choice of different capacity
mechanisms, we assume that both countries are perfectly symmetric in the sense
that they face identical demand for electricity, DA = DB =
D
2
, and target the same
reliability level of electricity, i.e., the probability that no power outage (“blackout”)
occurs due to insufficient capacity. In our model, fixing a reliability level is equiva-
lent to fixing the corresponding capacity in the market. Both countries ensure the
same capacity level x TA = x
T
B ∈

0, 1
2

. The countries A and B only differ in the
choice of capacity mechanism: Strategic reserves are procured in country A, while
capacity payments are used in country B to ensure this capacity target.
Strategic reserves are generation capacities procured and controlled by a regulator
and are only used in case of scarcity, i.e., when a supply shortage occurs or the spot
market price rises above a previously determined trigger price. Strategic reserves
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are used to fill the gap between the capacity that is built (and participate) in the
market xA and the target capacity x
T
A . In country A, the regulator procures strategic
reserves of size xRA that satisfy
x TA = xA+ x
R
A .
Capacity payments z are fees that are uniformly paid according to each capacity
unit to achieve the capacity target. The regulator in B fixes capacity payments
x TB = xB (z) .
The total capacity for both countries is then given by x T = x TA + x
T
B .
Firms offer electricity on the spot market, knowing the realization of demand. When
there is sufficient capacity available to cover the demand, competition drives prices
down to marginal costs c. Otherwise, electricity is scarce and the maximum price
P¯ > c is reached.6,7 The maximum price P¯ refers either to a price cap fixed by
a regulator or to the value of lost load (VOLL) that denotes the maximal amount
customers are willing to pay for electricity.
Cross-border trading impacts the spot market prices as follows: When the transmis-
sion capacity α is non-binding, cross-border trading leads to equal prices in both
markets, i.e., either there is sufficient capacity to cover the demand in A and B or
scarcity prices occur in both markets. However, if α is a binding restriction, the
prices in A and B may differ.
We assume that the trigger price of the strategic reserves equals the maximum price
P¯, i.e., strategic reserves do not push prices below the maximum price. Strategic
reserves are only used if there is not sufficient (generation or transmission) capacity
participating in the market to cover demand.
3.2.1 Spot Market Competition and Investments
We start by analyzing the spot market and its outcome. Since both countries target
the same capacity level x TA = x
T
B , but country A’s strategic reserves x
R
A do not par-
ticipate in the spot market while in B the whole capacity x TB = xB participates, we
6We assume that a partial blackout occurs, if electricity demand exceeds supply. In this case, there
will be exactly so many consumers cut off from the electricity supply such that the remaining
consumption equals the given supply.
7We assume that scarcity prices occur if and only if capacity is equal to or less than demand. One
could expect scarcity prices to occur if there is just enough capacity, i.e., ε more than needed.
However, in this case, the given capacity would change by the constant amount ε and our results
would be the same.
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restrict our attention to the case that xA ≤ xB. The spot market prices behave as
follows: When demand is less than the domestic firms’ capacities in both countries,
the spot market prices equal the marginal costs c. Moreover, even if the demand
exceeds the domestic firms’ capacities in A, the prices equal marginal costs c in both
countries if the total capacity of both countries exceeds the total demand D and α
is sufficiently large, i.e., D
2
− xA < α. In contrast, if the total demand D exceeds
the total capacities, the price equals the maximum price P¯ in A - and if, in addition,
xB − D2 ≤ α, the price also rises to P¯ in B. Obviously, scarcity prices occur in both
countries when the demand exceeds the domestic capacities in both countries. More
comprehensively, the spot market prices in A are given by
PA =
P¯ otherwisec if D < xA+ xB and D2 − xA < α. (3.1)
The spot market prices in B are given by
PB =
P¯ if D ≥ xA+ xB and xB − D2 ≤ αc otherwise. (3.2)
We assume that firms in both countries always receive the domestic price for selling
electricity, and consumers in both countries always pay the domestic price for elec-
tricity consumption. Congestion rents, which occur when a limited α results in price
differences between two markets, are shared between (the transmission system op-
erators of) both countries equally.8 Hence, implicitly, consumers of both countries
benefit equally from congestion rents.
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we restrict our attention to the case xA+
xB ≤ 1. Independent from the realization of demand, it follows from equations
(3.1) and (3.2) that α is always non-binding if xB − xA ≤ 2α.9 Hence, dependent
on xA, xB and α, we distinguish between two possible outcomes for the expected
variable spot market profits per capacity unit in both countries:
Case 1. If α is at least sometimes binding, i.e., xB − xA > 2α, the expected variable
spot market profits per capacity unit for firms in A and B differ and are given by
8This is basically how congestion rents resulting from market coupling are shared, e.g., in the Central
West Europe region, see CWE MC Project Group (2010).
9The following relationship holds: xA+ xB ≤ 2xA+ 2α⇔ xB − xA ≤ 2α⇔ 2xB − 2α ≤ xA+ xB . If
xB− xA ≤ 2α holds, PA (D) = PB (D) for all D ∈ [0, 1]. If xB− xA > 2α holds, PA = P¯ if D ≥ 2xA+2α
and PB = P¯ if D ≥ 2xB − 2α.
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piSA =
 
P¯ − c1− G  2xA+ 2α (3.3)
piSB =
 
P¯ − c1− G  2xB − 2α , (3.4)
respectively.
Case 2. If α is always non-binding, i.e., xB − xA ≤ 2α, the firms’ expected variable
spot market profits per capacity unit are the same in both countries A and B and are
given by
piSA = pi
S
B =
 
P¯ − c1− G  xA+ xB . (3.5)
Remark 1. If α is (sometimes) binding, the expected variable spot market profits per
capacity unit are higher in country A than in country B. Moreover, piSA is decreasing in
α and piSB is increasing in α.
Since we consider competitive markets, firms enter the market until profits are
driven down to zero.10 The firms’ zero profit condition in A is then given by
0= k−piSA. (3.6)
In B the capacity payments z that are paid for each unit of capacity impact the firms’
investments. The firms’ zero profit condition in B can be written as
z = k−piSB. (3.7)
The strategic reserves are only used in times of scarcity and as mentioned above the
trigger price equals the maximum price P¯. Hence, the usage policy follows
qRA =min

xRA , max

0,
D
2
− xA−α, D− xA− xB

,
where we define qRA as the amount of electricity produced by the reserve capacities.
Strategic reserves are given by the difference xRA = x
T
A − xA, i.e., strategic reserves
are capacities that are not worth building in the market because they would earn
negative profits. Additional payments are necessary that are born by the consumers,
as we discuss below.
10We assume that regulators want to increase the reliability level of electricity, i.e., they choose a target
capacity that is at least as large as the capacity that would have been built in the market without
any capacity mechanism. To make sure that xRA ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0, we assume that kP¯−c > 1− G
 
x T

.
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To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we assume that x T ≥ 2α.11 In addition, we
make the following
Assumption 1. The maximum spot market mark-up P¯ − c is strictly larger than the
fixed costs of capacity k.
3.2.2 Consumers’ Costs
The consumers’ costs can be split into two parts: First, consumers pay (spot market
prices) for their electricity consumption. Second, the consumers have to bear the
costs incurred by the capacity mechanisms, i.e., they pay for the reliability level.12
The consumers’ costs CCA and CCB in A and B, respectively, are given by
CCA = CC
S
A + CC
SR
A and CCB = CC
S
B + CC
Z
B , (3.8)
where we define CCSA and CC
S
B as the costs incurred on the spot markets, CC
SR
A as
the strategic reserves’ costs and CC ZB as the costs arising from capacity payments.
While the costs from capacity payments are simply given by
CC ZB = zxB,
the costs of the strategic reserves depend on the usage of the strategic reserves:
CCSRA = kx
R
A −
 
P¯ − cEqRA D, xA, xRA , xB,α .
The consumers pay the procurement costs (defined as the fixed costs) of the strate-
gic reserves and the generation costs. At the same time, spot market revenues
generated by strategic reserve capacities are used to partially offset these costs and
hence benefit the consumers.
Furthermore, congestion rents may benefit consumers by lowering their costs. These
rents are shared equally between the two countries. Since we are not interested
in the magnitude of consumers’ costs but rather in the cost differential between
11In our model, there is no need to consider transmission capacity that is larger than the maximum
generation capacity in one of the two countries.
12Furthermore, blackout costs occur if sufficient capacity is not available to cover demand. The
blackout price is at least as high as the maximum price P¯ that occurs on the spot market (and
is always finite). However, since both countries have identical demand for electricity and the same
reliability level, the blackout costs are the same in both countries. We are not interested in the
absolute amount of consumer cost but rather in the cost difference between the two countries;
therefore we neglect these costs in our analysis.
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consumers of both countries, we do not specify the congestion rent in our model. In
the following, the consumers’ costs in both countries are analyzed.
Benchmark: Isolated countries
In order to compare both capacity mechanisms, let us consider the case in which
there does not exist any transmission capacity between A and B, i.e., α= 0.
Proposition 1. The target reliability level is reached by capacity payments and strate-
gic reserves. The consumers’ costs are the same for both mechanisms.
The intuition is as follows: In our model with competitive firms and free entry, firms
enter the market until profits are driven down to zero. This happens regardless of
where the revenue streams come from. Hence, in both countries, the consumers
pay the exact amount that is necessary to reach the previously determined capacity
level.
3.3 A Simple Numerical Example
We discuss a simple numerical example in order to highlight some effects resulting
from different capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. Consider the two
symmetric countries A and B that are connected by transmission capacity α= 0.05.
The maximum price for electricity is given by P¯ = 1000 and the firms can produce
electricity at costs c = 100. The fixed costs are given by k = 9. The regulators of
both countries target the same capacity level x TA = x
T
B = 0.5, i.e., total capacity is
given by x T = 1. While the regulator in A procures strategic reserves to reach the
capacity target, the regulator in B determines capacity payments that are paid for
each unit of capacity.
For the fixed target capacity, firms’ revenue streams to cover total costs must either
come from the spot market or from the capacity mechanism. In country A, in equi-
librium the spot market revenues earned by capacity xA are exactly as large as the
firms’ total costs. The costs of the strategic reserves xRA are born by the consumers
and given by the difference between the sum of procurement (defined by the fixed
costs) and generation costs and the spot market revenues. Hence, the higher the
spot market revenues of the strategic reserves become, the lower the costs of the
strategic reserves will be. In country B, the total costs of capacity x TB = xB are ex-
actly covered by the sum of spot market revenues and capacity payments. Hence,
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the costs of the capacity mechanisms strongly depend on the variable spot market
profits. The firms’ variable spot market profits, in turn, depend not only on the do-
mestic electricity demand but also on cross-border transmission capacity between
both countries. Let us assume that in A, firms build up capacities xA = 0.3 and
hence the regulator procures xRA = 0.2 as strategic reserves. We split the possible
spot market outcomes into three different cases:
• If demand is sufficiently small, i.e., D < 0.7, the spot market price equals
marginal generation costs in both countries since sufficient generation capac-
ity is built in the market or transmission capacity is available to cover total
demand. In these hours, firms in both countries do not earn any profits to
cover their fixed costs.
• If 0.7 ≤ D < 0.9, the prices in both countries differ. Suppose demand is
given by D = 0.8. In country A, the price rises up to P¯ and in country B,
the price equals marginal generation costs c. To cover the demand in A, the
capacities that are built in the market xA = 0.3 are fully utilized, electricity
is imported from country B according to the transmission capacity α = 0.05
and the strategic reserves are used, which amounts to qRA = 0.05. Even though
consumers pay the high price for D
2
= 0.4, only xA+qRA = 0.35 of A’s capacity is
used and profits from the high prices. The congestion rent, which results from
the electricity import, is shared between both countries equally.13 Consumers
in country A pay P¯ for each unit of electricity. However, only a fraction of
the corresponding revenues is earned by the country’s own firms, allowing
for the reduction of ex ante payments for strategic reserve capacities. For the
exports from B to A, part of the payments for electricity consumption “leaks”
over country B and contributes to the financing of B’s firms.
• If 0.9 ≤ D < 1, the maximum price is reached in both countries. Suppose
demand is given by D = 0.95. In that case, B’s total capacities xB = 0.5 are
fully utilized, while in A the capacities that are built in the market xA = 0.3
are fully utilized but the strategic reserves do not operate at full capacity, qRA =
0.15. Although consumers from both countries pay the same for electricity
consumption, the costs of the capacity mechanisms are reduced more in B
than in A.
Hence, in this example, the consumers’ costs are higher in A than in B. So far, we
have not proved whether the capacities in A are equilibrium capacities, i.e., we do
13If the congestion rent had been completely given to country A, the additional costs on the spot
market due to higher prices would equal the cost reduction by the congestion rent.
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not know whether xA = 0.3 would have been built in the market for given assump-
tions on P¯, c, k and α. To solve the problem, one has to specify the distribution of
demand. Suppose the demand is beta-distributed, D ∼ Beta (2,5); then x∗A ≈ 0.3
and xR∗A ≈ 0.2 are indeed equilibrium outcomes.
In the following section, we determine equilibrium outcomes for any arbitrary choice
of P¯, c, α, x T and distribution of demand G. Furthermore, we show that the result
from our example always holds, i.e., the consumers’ costs for A are always higher
than those for B.
3.4 Cross-Border Effects on Market Equilibria
In this section, we investigate cross-border effects resulting from different capacity
mechanisms in the two connected countries. We henceforth assume that α > 0. In
particular, we are interested in the size of the strategic reserves, the capacity that is
built in the market, the amount of capacity payments and the effects on consumers’
costs. We can generally establish the following
Proposition 2. Assume countries A and B use different capacity mechanisms, namely
strategic reserves and capacity payments, to ensure the same reliability level. For every
given combination of P¯, c, k, any distribution of demand G, transmission capacity α
and target capacity x T , a unique market equilibrium exists. The equilibrium capacities
x∗A, xR∗A and capacity payments z∗ are characterized as follows:
(i) If 1− G (2α)> k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T − 2α< k
P¯−c ,
xR∗A > 0, x∗A > 0 and z∗ > 0.
(ii) If 1− G (2α)≤ k
P¯−c and 2α <
x T
2
,
xR∗A =
x T
2
, x∗A = 0 and z∗ > 0.
In (i) and (ii), Case 1 holds; i.e., α is sometimes binding.
(iii) If 1− G

x T
2

> k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T − 2α≥ k
P¯−c ,
xR∗A > 0, x∗A > 0 and z∗ = 0.
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(iv) If 1− G

x T
2

≤ k
P¯−c and 2α≥ x
T
2
,
xR∗A =
x T
2
, x∗A = 0 and z∗ > 0.
In (iii) and (iv), Case 2 holds; i.e., α is always non-binding.14
Let us first discuss (i) and (ii), i.e., the cases in which the transmission capacity α is
binding. Depending on whether or not P (D > 2α)> k
P¯−c , the equilibrium capacities
in A that are built in the market are either positive or zero. The threshold value k
P¯−c
can be interpreted as a measure of how severe the missing money problem is: The
higher the difference between the maximum spot market mark-up P¯ − c and the
fixed costs k is, the less severe the missing money problem becomes (for a given
capacity target x T ). Given the distribution of demand G and transmission capacity
α, a lower threshold value leads to an equilibrium in which (positive) capacities
are built in the market in A. In contrast, if the difference between the maximum
spot market mark-up and the fixed costs is sufficiently small, all capacities in A are
procured as strategic reserves. In cases (iii) and (iv), the arguments are similar. The
difference in these cases is that the capacity level x T , instead of the transmission
capacity α, is crucial. Depending on whether or not the probability of demand
exceeding A’s target capacity is greater than the threshold value, capacity that is
built in the market is positive or zero.
The intuition of this proposition is as follows: The amount of capacity that is built
in A depends on the value of the spot market mark-up relative to the fixed costs and
on the frequency in which high prices occur. If the maximum spot market mark-up
is relatively high, sufficient variable spot market profits can be earned in peak price
periods to cover the fixed costs of capacities and therefore, (positive) capacities are
built in A.
Note that for case (iii) in which α is always non-binding and thus the spot market
prices are always the same in both countries, some capacities are procured as strate-
gic reserves in A, while the capacity payments in B are zero. This means that only
consumers in A pay for the capacity mechanism while consumers from both coun-
tries benefit from the same reliability level and pay exactly the same amount for
electricity consumption. In the following, we investigate the redistribution effects
that are induced by different capacity mechanisms.
14See the proof of Proposition 2 for the equilibrium capacities in the Appendix.
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Redistribution Effects
The effects of different capacity mechanisms in two connected countries on con-
sumers’ costs can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3. Assume the regulator in A procures strategic reserves xRA while the
regulator in B uses capacity payments z to ensure a total capacity level x TA = x
T
B . If
α > 0, the expected consumers’ costs are higher in A than in B, i.e., CCA > CCB.
Intuition for why the consumers’ costs in A are higher than in B: Given a fixed
capacity target x TB , higher expected variable profits pi
S
B lead to a reduction of ca-
pacity payments z and vice versa. That is, firms in B earn profits if P = P¯, and the
amount of capacity payments is reduced exactly by the amount of profits that firms
earn during these peak price periods. Accordingly, the capacity payment costs for
consumers in B are reduced. Similarly, the strategic reserve costs for consumers in
A are reduced by the amount of profits of the strategic reserves. Since both coun-
tries have the same amount of capacity and, in country A a part of its capacities are
procured as strategic reserves, peak price periods occur either in both countries or
only in country A. If the peak price occurs only in country A, electricity is imported
from country B according to the transmission capacity α and congestion rents are
split equally, i.e., country B benefits from the congestion rents that are paid by A’s
consumers. If peak prices occur, in both countries which is, e.g., the case if α is
non-binding, the capacities xA and xB are both fully utilized. However, if demand
is less than total capacity x T = x TA + x
T
B , the strategic reserves x
R
A by definition do
not operate at full capacity. It follows that the average utilization of capacity in B
is higher than in A during peak price periods. If α is non-binding, consumers in
both countries pay the same for electricity consumption. Consumers in B benefit
from peak prices due to reduced capacity payments, while the costs of the strategic
reserves in A decrease to a lesser extent. Hence, on average, the consumers’ costs in
A are higher than in B.
This intuition is quite robust: Even if we had an elastic electricity demand the ex-
pected variable spot market profits per capacity unit would be higher in the country
with capacity payments than in the country with strategic reserves during peak price
periods. This intuition also holds true if demand for electricity varies between both
countries. If prices are high the strategic reserves is still the last resort that is used
to cover demand. This negatively impacts the consumer costs of the country with
strategic reserves.
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Remark 2. Proposition 3 shows that different capacity mechanisms in two connected
countries induce redistribution effects and hence impact the welfare of each country.
However, total welfare does not change: Regardless of whether both countries choose
strategic reserves, capacity payments, or one chooses capacity payments and the other
procures strategic reserves, the total welfare remains the same.
3.5 Base and Peak Load Technologies
This section studies the robustness of our results regarding the redistribution ef-
fects of different capacity mechanisms for the case of two technologies. Firms in
both countries A and B invest in two different technologies xA, xB ∈ [0, 1] and
x1A, x
1
B ∈ [0,1], i.e., base and peak load technologies, respectively. The investment
and marginal generation costs are denoted by k, c ∈ R+ and k1, c1 ∈ R+ for base
load (BL) and peak load (PL) technologies, respectively. Base load technologies are
characterized by higher fixed costs and lower marginal generation costs compared
to peak load technologies, i.e., k > k1 and c < c1. Investments into a generation
mix are reasonable due to the fluctuating demand: While base load capacities pro-
duce relatively cheaply but have to run many hours to cover the high investment
costs, peak load capacities are cheap to build but have high marginal generation
costs and hence operate only in times of high demand. To avoid uninteresting case
distinctions, we restrict our attention to the case in which it is worth investing in
both technologies and henceforth make the following
Assumption 2. The maximum spot market mark-up P¯ − c1 is strictly larger than the
fixed costs of the peak load capacity k1, and the difference in marginal generation costs
c1− c of both technologies is strictly larger than the difference in fixed costs k− k1. In
order to ensure that it is reasonable to invest in a generation mix, k−k1
c1−c >
k1
P¯−c must
hold.
In this extension, we restrict our analysis to the case in which the transmission
capacity α is sufficiently large such that it is always non-binding.
We start by characterizing the spot market and its outcome. Firms offer electricity on
the spot market knowing the realized demand. When there is sufficient base load
capacity available to cover demand, competition drives prices down to marginal
costs c. Correspondingly, when demand exceeds the base load capacity but is less
than the sum of the base and peak capacities, the price c1 > c is reached. If capacity
is scarce, the maximum price P¯ > c1 occurs. Since we assume that there is sufficient
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transmission capacity α, the spot market prices are always the same in both markets
and characterized by
PA = PB =

c if D < xA+ xB
c1 if xA+ xB ≤ D < xA+ xB + x1A + x1B
P¯ otherwise.
(3.9)
The spot market profits per capacity unit for base and peak load capacities are then
given by
pisBLA = pi
s
BLB
=
 
P¯ − c−  P¯ − c1G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B−  c1− cG  xB + xA
pisP LA = pi
s
P LB
=
 
P¯ − c11− G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B ,
respectively.
As in the main model, we assume that both countries encourage the same capacity
level x TA = x
T
B ∈

0, 1
2

, and total capacity is given by x T = x TA + x
T
B . The regulator
in A procures strategic reserves xRA ≥ 0, while the regulator in B fixes capacity
payments z ≥ 0 to ensure the capacity level.15 The total capacities in A and B are
then given by
x TA = xA+ x
1
A + x
R
A and x
T
B = xB (z) + x
1
B (z) .
Since we consider competitive markets, firms enter the market until profits are
driven down to zero. The firms’ zero profit conditions in A for base and peak load
technologies are given by
0 = k−pisBLA
0 = k1−pisP LA,
respectively. The firms’ zero profit conditions in B for base load and peak load
technologies are given by
0 = k−pisBLB − z
0 = k1−pisP LB − z,
15We assume that the regulators want to increase the reliability level of electricity, i.e., they choose
a target capacity that is at least as large as the capacity that would have been built in the market
without any capacity mechanism. To make sure that xRA ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0, we assume that k1P¯−c1 >
1− G  x T.
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respectively.
Benchmark: One capacity mechanism for both countries.
In order to compare both capacity mechanisms, let us consider the case in which
regulators of both countries choose the same capacity mechanism.
Proposition 4. Assume the regulators choose the same capacity mechanism. Both
capacity mechanisms are efficient in the sense that they ensure the target capacity level
with minimal costs. The total equilibrium base load capacity is given by
x∗A+ x∗B = G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

.
The consumers’ costs are the same for both mechanisms.
Interestingly, the equilibrium base load capacity x∗A + x∗B neither depends on the
target capacity level x T , nor on the choice of capacity mechanism, nor on the max-
imum price P¯. The efficient amount of base load capacity is solely determined by
the relation between fixed costs and variable generation costs between base and
peak load technologies. The reason is as follows: Since we assume that it is worth
it to invest in both technologies (by Assumption 2), peak load capacity is needed
that operates so infrequently that its fixed cost advantage over base load capacity
dominates the disadvantage of higher generation costs. If the regulators want to
increase the reliability level of electricity and fix a capacity target x T = x TA + x
T
B ,
the additional capacity units are used even less and hence peak load capacities are
built to reach the target. This holds for both mechanisms. Since the total capacity
is fixed and the firms’ profits are zero, the consumers’ costs remain the same.
Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries.
From now on, we investigate cross-border effects resulting from different capacity
mechanisms in the two fully connected countries. We can establish the following
Proposition 5. Assume the regulator in A procures strategic reserves xRA , while the
regulator in B uses capacity payments z to ensure the capacity level x TA = x
T
B , and both
countries are fully connected. The equilibrium capacities are characterized as follows:
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(i) If 1− G

x T
2

> k
1
P¯−c1 ,
xR∗A > 0, x∗A+ x1∗A > 0 and z∗ = 0.
(ii) If 1− G

x T
2

≤ k1
P¯−c1 ,
xR∗A =
x T
2
, x∗A = x1∗A = 0 and z∗ > 0.
In (i) and (ii), the total base load capacity is independent of the total capacity level x T
and the maximum price P¯ and is given by x∗A+ x∗B = G−1

1− k−k1
c1−c

.
As in Proposition 4, the total equilibrium base load capacity is independent of the
choice of capacity mechanism: It is exactly equal to the amount of base load ca-
pacity that would have been built in the market without any capacity mechanism.
However, the amount of peak load capacity depends on the target capacity level.
Depending on whether or not P

D > x
T
2

> k
1
P¯−c1 , the equilibrium capacities in A
that are built in the market are positive or zero. The threshold value k
1
P¯−c1 indicates
how severe the missing money problem is, i.e., the maximum spot market mark-up
P¯ − c1 relative to the fixed costs of the peak capacity k1 is crucial for the amount
of capacity that is procured as strategic reserves. Given the distribution of demand
and the target capacity x T , a higher threshold value leads to the case in which the
whole capacity in A has to be procured as strategic reserves.
Note, that in case (ii), each unit of the total base load capacity receives capacity
payments. In both cases, only peak load capacity is procured as strategic reserve.
The redistribution effects that are induced by the choice of different capacity mech-
anisms in connected countries can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 6. Assume the regulator in A procures strategic reserves xRA , while the
regulator in B uses capacity payments z to ensure the capacity level x TA = x
T
B , and both
countries are fully connected. The expected consumers’ costs are higher in A than in B.
The intuition for this result is similar to that in the case of one technology: In peak
price periods, the total capacity x TB = xB+ x
1
B and the capacities xA, x
1
A that are built
in the market are fully utilized. However, if demand is less than total capacity, the
strategic reserves xRA do not operate at full capacity in these periods. Even though
the electricity consumption costs are equal, firms’ expected variable spot market
profits per capacity unit are higher in B than in A. Hence, the consumers’ costs from
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strategic reserves are higher than capacity payment costs.
Corollary 3. Regardless of whether regulators of both countries choose strategic re-
serves, capacity payments or one chooses capacity payments and the other procures
strategic reserves, the joint welfare remains the same.
3.6 Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this study to understand the cross-border effects of dif-
ferent capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. For our analysis, we have
chosen a model with two symmetric countries that are connected by some given
transmission capacity. Both countries only differ in their regulator’s choice of capac-
ity mechanisms, namely strategic reserves or capacity payments. In both countries,
competitive firms can freely enter the market and invest in generation capacities
before selling electricity on the spot market, which is characterized by fluctuating
price-inelastic electricity demand. We have characterized different market equilib-
ria and found the following main result: Even if both forms of capacity mechanisms
lead to an efficient generation mix and induce the same consumer costs in isolated
countries, different capacity mechanisms lead to redistribution effects for intercon-
nected countries. The country with strategic reserves is worse off; more precisely,
the consumers’ costs are higher in the country with strategic reserves than in the
country with capacity payments. We have shown that this result holds robustly for
the case of two technologies.
The main effect that drives this result comes from the fact that strategic reserves
are used only if electricity import is limited by transmission capacity or no suffi-
cient (other) capacities are available. Hence, in times of scarcity when demand is
less than total capacity, part of the high payments for electricity consumption in the
country with strategic reserves are not earned by the country’s own firms but “leaks”
over to the country with capacity payments and implicitly benefits its consumers.
In our model, we have chosen completely symmetric countries in order to point
out the effects resulting from different capacity mechanisms. However, this effect
should have more general implications: First, even if we had an elastic electricity
demand or demand varied between both countries, the average capacity utilization
during peak price periods in which the transmission capacity is non-binding would
be higher for the country with capacity payments than in the country with strate-
gic reserves. Second, even if the maximum price varied between the two countries
and was, e.g., lower in the country with capacity payments, the consumers who pay
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capacity payments would benefit from the fact that strategic reserves are only used
as a last resort. In our model, we assume that both countries (agree to) ensure the
same reliability level of electricity. We have not analyzed the effects resulting from
choosing different reliability levels of electricity. Obviously, due to cross-border trad-
ing, the reliability level in one country depends on the reliability level of the other
country and vice versa. Hence, different choices may also impact the consumers’
costs in both countries.
The result we established may be informative for the policy debate surrounding
the design of capacity mechanisms and the effects for the internal market in Eu-
rope. In this discussion, one should take into account that such policy interventions
may lead to redistribution effects. Redistribution may affect the choice of capacity
mechanism as well as the cooperation between different countries. It is clear that
cross-border trading can be beneficial for the countries involved and reduce con-
sumers’ costs, e.g., through increased competition or a better technology mix that
lowers the costs of production. However, the cross-border effects resulting from
the choice of different capacity mechanisms can induce negative welfare effects for
individual countries, as shown in our analysis.
In our analysis, we have chosen a theoretical model to investigate the cross-border
effects of different capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries to clearly point out
the factors that drive these effects. Further research could quantify the equilibrium
investments and the redistribution effects for an existing market. This would be
very interesting in light of the recently introduced market coupling in the North-
West region of Europe and the different capacity mechanisms that are currently
being implemented.
3.7 Appendix
The Appendix contains all proofs of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1.
From equation (3.6) follows that the firms’ zero profit condition in A is given by
0=
 
P¯ − c 1− G  2xA− k.
The unique equilibrium capacity is then given by x∗A = 12 G
−11− k
P¯−c

since x∗A
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is the unique solution of the firms’ zero profit condition and x∗A > 0. The target
capacity is given by x TA =
x T
2
. The difference x TA − x∗A = xR∗A determines the reserve
capacity. The electricity consumption costs are given by
CCSA = c
∫ 2x∗A
0
D
2
g (D) dD+ P¯
∫ x T
2x∗A
D
2
g (D) dD+
x T
2

1− G x T . (3.10)
The costs from the strategic reserves are given by
CCSRA = kx
R∗
A −
 
P¯ − c∫ x T
2x∗A

D
2
− x∗A

g (D) dD+ xRA

1− G x T . (3.11)
The consumers’ costs are given by CCA = CCSA + CC
SR
A . Plugging x
∗
A into equations
(3.10) and (3.11) leads to
CCA = c
∫ x T
0
D
2
g (D) dD+
x T
2

1− G x T+ k x T
2
.
Let us consider country B. For a given capacity level x TB =
x T
2
, we can argue from
equation (3.7) that the capacity payments are given by
z = k−  P¯ − c1− G x T .
The electricity consumption costs are given by
CCSB =
c
2
∫ x T
0
Dg (D) dD+ P¯
x T
2

1− G x T .
The capacity payment costs are given by
CC ZB = zxB =

k−  P¯ − c1− G x T x T
2
.
The consumers’ costs are given by CCB = CCSB + CC
Z
B . Summing up leads to
CCB =
c
2
∫ x T
0
Dg (D) dD+ x T

1− G x T+ k x T
2
.
Hence, we have shown that CCA = CCB holds.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
For the proof of Proposition 2, we show first the following
Lemma. For every choice of P¯, c, k, G, α and x T , one and only one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) 1− G (2α)> k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T − 2α< k
P¯−c
(ii) 1− G (2α)≤ k
P¯−c and 2α <
x T
2
(iii) 1− G

x T
2

> k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T − 2α≥ k
P¯−c
(iv) 1− G

x T
2

≤ k
P¯−c and 2α≥ x
T
2
.
Proof. First, we show that only one of the four conditions can hold: Obviously,
only one of the conditions (i) and (ii), one of the conditions (i) and (iii), one of
the conditions (ii) and (iv), as well as only one of the conditions (iii) and (iv) can
hold. Hence, we have to show that only one of the conditions (i) and (iv) as well as
only one of the conditions (ii) and (iii) can hold: From (i) follows that 1−G (2α)>
k
P¯−c > 1− G

x T − 2α ⇒ x T − 2α > 2α ⇒ x T
2
> 2α. Hence, (iv) does not hold.
From (iv) follows that 1− k
P¯−c ≤ G

x T
2

≤ G (2α) ⇒ 1− G (2α) ≤ k
P¯−c . Hence,
(i) does not hold. From (ii) follows that G

x T
2

> G (2α) ≥ 1 − k
P¯−c ⇒ kP¯−c ≥
1− G

x T
2

. Hence, (iii) does not hold. From (iii) follows that G

x T
2

< 1− k
P¯−c .
If, in addition, 1− k
P¯−c ≤ G (2α) holds, 2α < x
T
2
can not hold. Hence, (ii) does not
hold. Thus, we have shown that only one of the four conditions above can hold.
Second, we prove that always one of the four conditions holds by showing that no
further cases exist. By considering all possible combinations of (a), (b), (c) and (d)
(a) 1− G (2α)> (≤) k
P¯ − c , (b) 1− G

x T
2

> (≤) k
P¯ − c ,
(c) 1− G x T − 2α< (≥) k
P¯ − c , (d) 2α < (≥)
x T
2
it follows directly that in 14 out of these 16 cases, either (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) occurs.
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We only have to analyze the following two cases:
I : (a) 1− G (2α)> k
P¯ − c , (b) 1− G

x T
2

≤ k
P¯ − c ,
(c) 1− G x T − 2α≥ k
P¯ − c , (d) 2α <
x T
2
.
I I : (a) 1− G (2α)≤ k
P¯ − c , (b) 1− G

x T
2

>
k
P¯ − c ,
(c) 1− G x T − 2α< k
P¯ − c , (d) 2α≥
x T
2
.
In case I, the conditions (a), (c) and (d) lead to
G

x T
2

= G

x T − 2α−

x T
2
− 2α

< G

x T − 2α≤ 1− k
P¯ − c .
This is a contradiction to (b). Hence, case I does not occur. In case II, the conditions
(a), (b) and (c) lead to
1− k
P¯ − c > G

x T
2

= G

x T − 2α−

x T
2
− 2α

> G

x T − 2α .
This is a contradiction to (c). Hence, case II can not occur. Therefore, we have
shown that for any choice of P¯, c, k, G, α and x T , exactly one of the conditions (i),
(ii), (iii) or (iv) occurs.
From the lemma above, we can argue that if we find for each of the four cases
(i)-(iv) unique equilibrium capacities, then there always exists an equilibrium that
is unique for given P¯,k, c, G, α and x T . The firms’ capacity in equilibrium has to
fulfill one of the following two conditions: (I) The firms’ capacity in equilibrium is
positive and their profits are zero. (II) The firms’ capacity is zero and the profits are
negative or zero.
Case (i): 1− G x T − 2α < k
P¯−c and 1− G (2α) > kP¯−c . The unique equilibrium
capacity x∗A that is built in the market in A and the capacity payments z∗ that are
paid in B are given by
x∗A =
1
2
G−1

1− k
P¯ − c

−α and z∗ = k−  P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α ,
for the following reasons: (1.) z∗ > 0 , (2.) x∗A > 0, (3.) z∗ and x∗A are the unique
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solutions for the firms’ zero profit conditions
0 =
 
P¯ − c 1− G  2xA+ 2α− k,
0 =
 
P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α+ z− k,
and (4.) x∗B − x∗A = x T2 − 12 G−1

1− k
P¯−c

−α > 2α.
Case (ii): 2α < x
T
2
and 1− G (2α)≤ k
P¯−c . These inequalities lead to
1− k
P¯ − c ≤ G (2α)≤ G

x T
2

= G

x T − 2α−

x T
2
− 2α

< G

x T − 2α ,
i.e., 1 − k
P¯−c < G

x T − 2α. The unique equilibrium capacity x∗A and capacity
payments z∗ are then given by
x∗A = 0 and z∗ = k−
 
P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α ,
for the following reasons: (1.) z∗ > 0, (2.) x∗A = 0,(3.) the profits for x∗A are
negative or zero
 
P¯ − c (1− G (2α))− k ≤  P¯ − c1−1− k
P¯ − c

− k = 0,
and z∗ is the unique solution for the zero profit condition of B’s firms
0=
 
P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α+ z− k,
and (4.) x∗B − x∗A = x T2 > 2α. The total capacity x TA = x
T
2
is procured as strategic
reserve.
Case (iii): 1− G x T − 2α ≥ k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T
2

> k
P¯−c . The unique equilibrium
capacity x∗A and capacity payments z∗ are then given by
x∗A = G−1

1− k
P¯ − c

− x
T
2
and z∗ = 0,
for the following reasons: (1.) z∗ = 0, (2.) x∗A > 0, (3.) z∗ and x∗A are the unique
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solutions for the firms’ zero profit conditions
0 =
 
P¯ − c1− GxA+ x T2

− k
0 =
 
P¯ − c1− GxA+ x T2

+ z− k,
and (4.) x∗B − x∗A = x T − G−1

1− k
P¯−c

≤ 2α.
Case (iv): 2α ≥ x T
2
and 1− G

x T
2

≤ k
P¯−c . The unique equilibrium capacity x
∗
A and
capacity payments z∗ are then given by
x∗A = 0 and z∗ = k−
 
P¯ − c1− G x T
2

,
for the following reasons: (1.) z∗ ≥ 0 , (2.) x∗A = 0, (3.) the profits for x∗A are
negative or zero
 
P¯ − c1− G x T
2

− k ≤  P¯ − c k
P¯ − c

− k = 0,
and x∗A and z∗ are the unique solution for the zero profit condition of B’s firms
0=
 
P¯ − c1− G x T
2

+ z− k,
and (4.) x∗B − x∗A = x T2 ≤ 2α. The total capacity x TA is procured as strategic reserve.
Hence, we have proven Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The consumers’ costs are given by equation (3.8).
Case 1: Let us first consider the case in which α is sometimes binding and in which
the expected variable spot market profits per capacity unit in A and B are given by
equations (3.4) and (3.4). The electricity consumption costs in A and B are then
given by
CCSA = c
∫ 2xA+2α
0
D
2
g (D) dD+ P¯
∫ x T
2xA+2α
D
2
g (D) dD+
x T
2

1− G x T
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and
CCSB = c
∫ 2xB−2α
0
D
2
g (D) dD+ P¯
∫ x T
2xB−2α
D
2
g (D) dD+
x T
2

1− G x T ,
respectively. The costs from the strategic reserves are given by
CCSRA = kx
R
A −
 
P¯ − c∫ x T−2α
2xA+2α

D
2
− xA−α

g (D) dD
− P¯ − c∫ x T
x T−2α

D− xA− x
T
2

g (D) dD
− P¯ − c xRA  1− G  xT .
The capacity payment costs are given by
CC ZB = zxB =

k−  P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α x T
2
.
The difference in consumers’ costs is given by:
CCA− CCB = CCSA − CCSB + CCSRA − CC ZB
=
 
P¯ − c∫ x T−2α
2xA+2α
D
2
g (D) dD+
 
k−  P¯ − c 1− G  xT xRA
− P¯ − c∫ x T−2α
2xA+2α

D
2
− xA−α

g (D) dD
− P¯ − c∫ x T
x T−2α

D− xA− x
T
2

g (D) dD
−k−  P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α x T
2
>
 
k−  P¯ − c 1− G  xT xRA
+
 
P¯ − c xA+αG x T − 2α− G  2xA+ 2α
− P¯ − cx T − xA− x T2

G

x T
− G x T − 2α
−k−  P¯ − c1− G x T − 2α x T
2
=
 
P¯ − cαG x T − 2α−  xA+αG  2xA+ 2α+ xA− kxA
and the inequality holds due to
∫ x T
x T−2α Dg (D) dD < x
T

G

x T
− G x T − 2α.
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If 1 − G (2α) > k
P¯−c and 1 − G

x T − 2α < k
P¯−c , A’s equilibrium capacity x
∗
A is
given by x∗A = 12 G
−11− k
P¯−c

− α (see proof of Proposition 2). Using 1− k
P¯−c <
G

x T − 2α and plugging x∗A into the inequality leads to
CCA− CCB >  P¯ − cαG x T − 2α−  xA+αG  2xA+ 2α+ xA− kxA
>
 
P¯ − c xA+α 1− G  2xA+ 2α−  xA+α k
= 0.
If 1 − G (2α) ≤ k
P¯−c and 2α <
x T
2
, A’s equilibrium capacity is given by x∗A = 0.
Plugging x∗A into the inequality leads to
CCA− CCB >  P¯ − cαG x T − 2α−  xA+αG  2xA+ 2α+ xA− kxA
=
 
P¯ − cαG x T − 2α− G  2xA+ 2α
> 0.
Hence, we have proven that in cases (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, CCA > CCB holds.
Case 2: Let us consider the case in which α is always non-binding and in which
the expected variable spot market profits per capacity unit in A and B are given by
equation (3.5). The electricity consumption costs in A and B are the same, and we
only have to analyze the difference between CCSRA and CC
Z
B . The costs from the
strategic reserves are given by
CCSRA = kx
R
A −
 
P¯ − c∫ x T
xA+xB
 
D− xA− xB g (D) dD+ xRA 1− G x T
 .
The capacity payment costs are given by
CC ZB = zxB =

k−  P¯ − c 1− G  xA+ xB x T2 .
Let us show that CCSRA > CC
Z
B :
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CC ZB − CCSRA
= kxA
− P¯ − cxA+ x T G x T− x T + xAGxA+ x T2

− P¯ − c−∫ x T
xA+
x T
2
Dg (D) dD

>

k−  P¯ − c1− GxA+ x T2

xA
and the inequality holds due to
∫ x T
xA+
x T
2
Dg (D) dD < x T

G

x T
− GxA+ x T2 .
If 1− G

x T
2

> k
P¯−c and 1− G

x T − 2α ≥ k
P¯−c , the capacity payments are zero
and
z∗ = k−  P¯ − c1− GxA+ x T2

= 0
holds (see proof of Proposition 2). Hence, CC ZB − CCSRA > 0.
If 1− G

x T
2

≤ k
P¯−c and 2α ≥ x
T
2
, equilibrium capacity in A is given by x∗A = 0.
Thus, CC ZB − CCSRA > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We define x := xA + xB and x1 := x1A + x
1
B. If both regulators choose strategic
reserves to ensure the target capacity level, the equilibrium capacities are given
by x∗ = G−1

1− k−k1
c1−c

and x1∗ = G−1

1− k1
P¯−c1

− x∗ since both capacities are
positive and the following zero profit conditions of both technologies are fulfilled:
BL : 0=
 
P¯ − c− P¯ − c1G x + x1− c1− cG (x)− k
P L : 0=

P¯ − c11− G x + x1− k1.
The strategic reserves are then given by
xR = x T − G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

.
If both regulators choose capacity payments, the equilibrium capacities are given
by x∗ = G−1

1− k−k1
c1−c

and x1∗ = G−1

1− k1−z
P¯−c1

− x∗ since both capacities are
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positive and the following zero profit conditions of both technologies are fulfilled:
BL : z = k−  P¯ − c+ P¯ − c1G x + x1+ c1− cG (x)
P L : z = k1− P¯ − c11− G x + x1 .
The capacity payments are given by z∗ = k1 − P¯ − c11− G x T. Since the
equilibrium capacities are the same for both mechanisms it follows directly that the
consumers’ costs are the same for both mechanisms.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The firms’ capacity in equilibrium has to fulfill one of the following two conditions:
(I) The firms’ capacitiy in equilibrium is positive and their profits are zero. (II) The
firms’ capacity is zero and the profits are negative or zero.
If 1−G

x T
2

> k
1
P¯−c1 , each vector x
∗ =

xA, xB, x
1
A, x
1
B

with xA > 0, xB > 0, x
1
A > 0
and x1B > 0 for which xA + xB = G
−11− k−k1
c1−c

, x1A + x
1
B = G
−11− k1
P¯−c1

−
G−1

1− k−k1
c1−c

and xB + x1B =
x T
2
holds constitute a market equilibrium in which
z∗ = 0 holds. The reason is that all capacities are positive and the following zero
profit conditions of both technologies in both countries are fulfilled:
BLB : 0 =
 
P¯ − c− P¯ − c1G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B
−c1− cG  xB + xA+ z− k
P LB : 0 =

P¯ − c11− G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B+ z− k1
BLA : 0 =
 
P¯ − c− P¯ − c1G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B
−c1− cG  xB + xA− k
P LA : 0 =

P¯ − c11− G xA+ xB + x1A + x1B− k1.
Furthermore, the following combinations of xA, xB, x
1
A, x
1
B constitute market equilib-
ria in which z∗ = 0 holds:
I : x∗B =
x T
2
− G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

+ G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

,
x1∗B = G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

− G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

,
x∗A = G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

− x
T
2
,
x1∗A = 0
66
3.7 Appendix
I I : x∗B = G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

,
x1∗B =
x T
2
− G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

x∗A = 0,
x1∗A = G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

− x
T
2
I I I : x∗B =
x T
2
,
x1∗B = 0
x∗A = G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

− x
T
2
,
x1∗A = G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

− G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

IV : x∗B = 0,
x1∗B =
x T
2
x∗A = G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

,
x1∗A = G−1

1− k
1
P¯ − c1

− G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

− x
T
2
.
The reason is that the capacities are either positive and the zero profit conditions
are fulfilled, or they are zero and the profits are zero or negative for these capacities.
The strategic reserves are given by xR∗A = x T − x∗A > 0.
If 1− G

x T
2

≤ k1
P¯−c1 , the unique market equilibrium is given by
x∗B = G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

, x1∗B = G−1

1− k
1− z
P¯ − c1

− G−1

1− k− k
1
c1− c

,
x∗A = 0, x1∗A = 0
and
z∗ = k1−

P¯ − c11− G x T
2

,
since x∗B and x1∗B fulfill the zero profits conditions and the profits for x∗A = x1∗A = 0
are zero or negative. By checking the equilibrium conditions for all other combina-
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tions of (a), (b), (c) and (d),
(a) xB > (=)0, (b) x
1
B > (=)0, (c) xA > (=)0, (d) x
1
A > (=)0,
we find that no further equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 6.
If z = 0 and xRA > 0, the consumers’ costs are obviously higher in A than in B. When
the equilibrium capacities and capacity payments are given by x∗1A = x∗A = 0 and
z∗ = k1−  P¯ − c1− G x T2 , the costs from the strategic reserves are given by
CCSRA = k
1 x
T
2
−  P¯ − c∫ x T
x1B+xB

D− x
T
2

g (D) dD+
x T
2

1− G x T .
The capacity payment costs are given by
CC ZB = zxB =

k1−  P¯ − c1− G x T
2

x T
2
.
The difference is given by
CC ZB − CCSRA =
 
P¯ − cx T G x T− G x T
2

−
∫ x T
x T
2
Dg (D) dD
 ,
which is positive since x T
∫ x T
x T
2
g (D) dD >
∫ x T
x T
2
Dg (D) dD.
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4 Spatial Dependencies of Wind Power and
Interrelations with Spot Price Dynamics
Wind power has seen strong growth over the last decade, increasingly affecting elec-
tricity spot prices. In particular, prices are more volatile due to the stochastic nature
of wind, such that more generation of wind energy yields lower prices. Therefore,
it is important to assess the value of wind power at different locations not only for
an investor but for the electricity system as a whole. In this paper, we develop a
stochastic simulation model that captures the full spatial dependence structure of
wind power by using copulas, incorporated into a supply- and demand-based model
for the electricity spot price. This model is calibrated with German data. We find
that the specific location of a turbine, i.e., its spatial dependence with respect to
the aggregated wind power in the system, is of high relevance for its value. Many
of the locations analyzed show an upper tail dependence that adversely impacts
the market value. Therefore, a model that assumes a linear dependence structure
would systematically overestimate the market value of wind power in many cases.
This effect becomes more important as levels of wind power penetration increase
and may render the large-scale integration into markets more difficult.
4.1 Introduction
The amount of electricity generated by wind power plants has increased significantly
during recent years. Due to the fact that wind power is stochastic, its introduction
into power systems has caused changes in electricity spot price dynamics: Prices
have become more volatile and exhibit a correlated behavior with wind power fed
into the system. In times of high wind, spot prices are observed to be generally
lower than in times with low generation from wind power plants. Empirical evi-
dence of this effect has been demonstrated for different markets characterized by
high wind power penetration, e.g., by Jónsson et al. (2010) for Denmark, Gelabert
et al. (2011) for Spain, Woo et al. (2011) for Texas or Cutler et al. (2011) for
the Australian market. Due to the cost-free availability of wind energy, wind power
plants are subject to marginal costs of generation that are lower than for other types
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of power plants such as coal or gas. Hence, when the wind blows, wind power re-
places other types of generation and thus leads to lower spot market prices in such
hours. As a consequence, power plants are faced with increasingly difficult condi-
tions and an additional source of price risk when participating in the market. Until
now, fluctuating renewable energy technologies (including wind power itself) have
often been exempted from this price risk by support mechanisms (e.g., by fixed
feed-in-tariff systems) in order to incentivize investments.1 However, their price
risk draws more and more attention as they start to make up an increasing share
of the generation mix and may at some point be fully integrated into the liberal-
ized power market. In this case, wind power plant operators would be obliged to
refinance their investments by selling wind power on the market. Therefore, for an
individual investor as well as for a social planner, it becomes increasingly important
to understand the value of wind power and how it depends on the location of the
wind turbine.
The purpose of this paper is to derive revenue distributions and the market value
of wind power, i.e., the weighted average spot price wind power is able to achieve
when selling its electricity on the spot market, at specific locations. It is clear that
the market value of a wind turbine at a specific location depends on whether it tends
to produce when many other wind turbines at other locations can also produce, or
whether it is one out of few producers at a given time. To capture the full stochastic
dependence structure of wind power, we use copulas and incorporate the stochastic
generation in a supply- and demand-based model for electricity prices. We calibrate
the model with German data since Germany already has a high share of wind power.
We find that taking the entire spatial dependence structure into account is indeed
necessary, and that considering only correlations between a specific turbine and the
aggregate wind power would be misleading. Even if the correlation of a specific
turbine is lower compared to another, the resulting market value may be lower due
to a non-linear, asymmetric dependence structure. In fact, we find a pronounced
upper tail dependence that adversely impacts the market value for many of the
locations analyzed. Therefore, a model solely based on linear dependence measures
would systematically overestimate the market value of wind power in many cases.
Moreover, it is shown that this effect becomes increasingly important for higher
levels of wind power penetration.
To derive these results, we take the following two steps. In a first step, we develop
1For a comprehensive overview of different renewable support mechanisms including their economic
implications, e.g., refer to Green and Yatchew (2012).
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a stochastic simulation model for electricity spot prices that incorporates the aggre-
gated wind power as one of the determinants. Electricity spot prices are very volatile
and follow daily, weekly and seasonal patterns due to a very price-inelastic fluctuat-
ing demand and limited storage possibilities of electricity. The market is designed as
such that in a competitive environment, suppliers who can offer electricity at lowest
marginal generation costs will cover the demand. If demand increases, those capac-
ities characterized by higher marginal generation costs are needed and generally
lead to higher electricity prices. Since the marginal costs of wind power are close
to zero, available production quantities will always cover some part of the demand
as long as prices are non-negative. This is why we use the residual demand, given
by the difference between total demand and aggregated wind power, to establish
the relationship between wind power and spot prices. In our model, we approx-
imate this relationship by a function estimated from hourly spot prices, demand
and wind power. We then feed the price formation process with aggregated wind
power series and add a stochastic component in order to cover additional stochastic
price movements caused, e.g., by unplanned power plant outages, scarcity prices
and speculation.
In the second step, we link the market’s aggregated wind power to the wind power
of single turbines in order to quantify their market value and the revenues depend-
ing on their specific location.2 We use copulas to model this interrelation. The
reason why copulas are necessary is illustrated by the following thought experi-
ment: Let there be two turbines A and B characterized by equal availability factors
and equal correlation coefficients between their own generation and the aggregated
generation of the turbines in the market. Turbine A follows the production pattern
of all other turbines very closely at low generation levels but is much less dependent
at high generation levels and can therefore realize high prices when producing at
full power. In contrast, turbine B faces the adverse situation of having a particularly
high probability that every time it runs at full power, a large share of all the other
turbines in the system is also running (i.e., a high correlation in the upper tail).
Hence, weighted average prices gained by turbine B will be lower.
Our paper contributes to three lines of literature. First, our paper builds on the liter-
ature on demand and supply models. Within this class of models, Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002) were among the first to study the importance of demand and pro-
2Note that our analysis of a single turbine is representative for one or multiple turbines at this specific
location. Due to the fact that wind speed conditions can be assumed to be equal for all turbines at
this specific location, the market value is independent of the number of turbines, whereas revenue
can simply be scaled by the amount of installed capacity.
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duction costs for electricity prices. They develop a theoretical model for electricity
derivatives and show that the level and variance of the electricity demand impact
the forward premium. Motivated by these theoretical foundations, Longstaff and
Wang (2004) provide empirical evidence for a significant forward premium in the
PJM market. Barlow (2002) presents a different approach to model electricity prices
based on an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model for the demand process and a functional
dependence between prices and demand. The model developed by Burger et al.
(2006) follows the same conceptual approach by including a non-linear functional
dependence of the electricity spot price on a stochastic demand process as well as
long-term non-stationarity. Their model is used to price derivatives via Monte Carlo
simulation. Howison and Coulon (2009) employ a stochastic electricity bid stack,
i.e., detailed information on the supply curve. They further extend the number of
state variables explaining the electricity spot price by including fuel prices. We ex-
tend this literature by including stochastic production quantities of wind power that
may impact the supply side and hence electricity prices.
Secondly, we build on the literature using copulas. Copulas were first identified by
Papaefthymiou (2006) to be a suitable tool in modeling multivariate dependencies
of wind power. Grothe and Schnieders (2011) model spatial dependencies of wind
speeds in order to allocate wind farms in Germany such that an optimal reduction
of power output fluctuations is achieved. Hagspiel et al. (2012) model European
wind power based on copula theory and use the simulated data as an input for
a probabilistic load flow analysis. In contrast to the existing literature, we apply
conditional copulas to model the dependence structure between the generation of
specific turbines and the aggregated wind power. The latter, in turn, is needed as
an input for the spot price model.
Finally, our paper complements ongoing research on the valuation of power gener-
ation assets. So far, this line of research has mainly focused on conventional power
(e.g., Thompson et al. (2004), Porchet et al. (2009) or Falbo et al. (2010)) and the
optimization of hydro power schedules (e.g., García-González et al. (2007) or Dens-
ing (2013)). Furthermore, a number of papers have valued wind power based on
historical data (e.g., Green and Vasilakos (2012)). However, we know of no study
presenting a model that fully captures the stochastic of wind power and interrela-
tions with spot price dynamics.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a short
introduction to copula modeling with a particular focus on conditional copula sam-
pling, which we apply in our model. The model itself is presented in Section 4.3.
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Section 4.4 reports the results of the methodology applied to the case of wind power
in Germany, namely the revenues and the market value of specific wind turbines.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Stochastic Dependence Modeling using Copulas
In this section, we briefly discuss the modeling of stochastic dependencies with the
help of copulas, as used in our model. Specifically, we discuss the different copula
models that we consider and describe the conditional sampling procedure with re-
spect to our application. A more general introduction to copulas is provided, e.g.,
in Joe (1997), Nelsen (2006) or Alexander (2008). For a comprehensive literature
review of the current status and applications of copula models, the interested reader
is referred to Genest et al. (2009), Durante and Sempi (2010) and Patton (2012).
4.2.1 Copulas and Copula Models
A copula is a cumulative distribution function with uniformly distributed marginals
on [0,1]. Sklar’s theorem is the main theorem for most applications of copulas,
stating that any joint distribution of some random variables is determined by their
marginal distributions and the copula (Sklar (1959)). The bivariate form of Sklar’s
theorem is as follows: For the cumulative distribution function F : R2 → [0,1]
of any random variables X , W , with marginal distribution functions FX , FW , there
exists a copula C : [0, 1]2→ [0,1] such that
F(x , w) = C
 
FX (x), FW (w)

. (4.1)
The copula function is unique if the marginals are continuous.3 Conversely, if C is
a copula and FX and FW are continuous distribution functions of the random vari-
ables X , W , then (4.1) defines the bivariate joint distribution function. From Sklar’s
theorem, it follows that copulas can be applied with any marginal distributions.
Particularly, marginal distributions may differ for each of the random variables con-
sidered.
In our application we are interested in the dependence structure of the market’s
aggregated wind power W and a single turbine wind power X . The copula captures
the complete dependence structure of X and W . The selection of an appropriate
3Sklar’s theorem also holds for the multivariate case of n> 2 dimensions.
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copula model can be made independent from the choice of the marginal distribution
functions. Taking advantage of this, the joint distribution of W and X is determined
in a two stage process: First, the marginal distribution functions FW and FX are
determined, followed by the selection of the most appropriate copula model.
Copula functions are mostly determined in a parametric way. There are different
types of parametric copula models that can be used to capture the pairwise de-
pendence. In many applications – such as ours – it is particularly important to
differentiate between symmetric or asymmetric, tail or no tail, and upper or lower
tail dependence structures. Therefore, one can test several parametric copula mod-
els that are able to capture these characteristics: The Gaussian copula is symmetric
and has zero or weak tail dependence (unless the correlation is 1). In contrast,
the symmetric Student-t copula has a relatively strong symmetric tail dependence.
Whereas the Frank copula is another symmetric copula with particularly low tail de-
pendence, Clayton and Gumbel copulas incorporate an asymmetric tail dependence.
Lower tail dependence is captured by the Clayton copula, while the Gumbel copula
incorporates an upper tail dependence.4 These copulas are listed in Table 4.1.5
Table 4.1: Copula models
Copula family Copula function C (u, v)
Gaussian ΦΣ

Φ−1(u),Φ−1(v)

Student-t tΣ,ν

t−1ν (u), t−1ν (v)

Clayton

max
¦
u−θ + v−θ − 1, 0©−1/θ
Frank −1
θ
ln

1+ (
e−uθ−1)(e−vθ−1)
e−θ−1

Gumbel e−

(− ln(u))θ+(− ln(v))θ1/θ
The copula parameters can be estimated based on observed data by optimizing the
log-likelihood function:
θˆ =max
θ
∑
t
ln c
 
FX
 
x t

, FW
 
wt

;θ

(4.2)
4Gaussian and Student-t copulas belong to the group of Elliptical copulas, whereas Frank, Gumbel
and Clayton copulas belong to the group of Archimedian copulas. For a more extensive discussion
of different copula families, see, e.g., Nelsen (2006)
5u and v can be interpreted as FX (x) and FW (w), respectively. ΦΣ denotes the multivariate normal
distribution function with covariance matrix Σ and tΣ,ν the multivariate Student-t distribution with
ν degrees of freedom and covariance matrix Σ.
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where θ denotes the parameter vector and c the copula density. The selection of
the most appropriate copula model can then be determined based on the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC).
4.2.2 Conditional Copula and Simulation Procedure
Like any ordinary joint distribution function, copulas have conditional distribution
functions. The conditional copula can be calculated by taking first derivatives with
respect to each variable, i.e., for u= FX (x) and v = FW (w) we have
C(u|v) = ∂ C(u, v)
∂ v
and C(v|u) = ∂ C(u, v)
∂ u
. (4.3)
For the application presented in this paper, there is one inherent advantage of using
conditional copulas rather than sampling directly from the bivariate copula distri-
bution: Samples can be conditioned on time series that may serve as inputs to the
simulation procedure.6 The time series characteristics can thus be preserved during
the simulation process.
We consider the stochastic processes
 
X t

t∈N and
 
Wt

t∈N. FX t (X t), FWt (Wt) are
uniformly distributed random variables on [0, 1]. For random variables Ut , Vt ∼
U (0, 1), F−1X t
 
Ut

and F−1Wt
 
Vt

thus follow the distributions of X t and Wt , respec-
tively. It is important to notice that by applying the inverse distribution functions,
the dependence structure is not influenced, i.e., Ut and Vt as well as FX t (X t) and
FWt (Wt) have the same copula C .
The conditional sampling procedure can be summarized as follows:
1. Apply the marginal distribution function FWt to the time series of the market’s
aggregated wind power
 
w1, w2, w3, ...

in order to get

v∗1 , v∗2 , v∗3 , ...

.
2. Simulate
 
u1, u2, u3, ...

from independent uniformly distributed random vari-
ables.
3. For each observation FWt
 
wt

= v∗t , apply the inverse conditional copula
C−1
FWt (Wt),FXt (X t)
·|v∗t  to translate ut into u∗t by:
u∗t = C−1FWt (Wt),FXt (X t)

ut |v∗t

(4.4)
6We use time series of the market’s aggregated wind power as an input variable for the spot price
model.
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4. Apply the inverse marginal distribution functions to

u∗1, u∗2, u∗3, ...

in order to
obtain the corresponding simulations of the random variable
X t :

F−1X1

u∗1

, F−1X2

u∗2

, F−1X3

u∗3

, ...

.
This sampling procedure is one of the main parts of our model that is described in
detail in the following section.
4.3 The Model
We develop a stochastic simulation model for the single turbine wind power and
electricity spot prices, including a precise representation of their interrelations. The
interrelation is established by the aggregated wind power that is related to both the
electricity spot prices as well as the single turbine wind power. Hence, we set up
a model that represents these two relationships: First, a supply and demand based
model that takes the aggregated wind power as an input. Second, a stochastic
dependence model that links the single turbine wind power to the aggregated wind
power. These two parts of the model can be summarized by the following two
equations:
St = ht
 
Dt −Wt+ Zt (4.5)
X t = F
−1
X t

C−1
FXt (X t),FWt (Wt)

Ut |FWt
 
Wt

(4.6)
where St is the hourly stochastic spot price and X t the hourly single turbine wind
power, for t ∈ N.
The spot price St is determined by two components: First, the function ht describes
the dependence of the spot price on the residual demand that is determined by the
difference of the electricity demand level Dt and the stochastic aggregated wind
power Wt . Second, a short term stochastic component adds to the spot price that is
denoted by Zt . As operators of wind power plants are able to curtail their power out-
put in case of negative spot prices, their price is non-negative, i.e., SWt =max

0, St
	
.
The second part of the model links the hourly single turbine wind power X t to
the hourly aggregated wind power Wt . FX t and FWt denote the corresponding
marginal distribution functions. The joint distribution function of these two ran-
dom variables is determined by the corresponding copula, i.e., FX t ,Wt
 
x t , wt

=
CFXt (X t),FWt (Wt)

FX t
 
x t

, FWt
 
wt

. Due to the copula’s ability to separate marginal
distribution functions and the dependence structure, the joint distribution function
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can be modeled in a two-step process: First, the marginal distribution functions FX ,t
and FW,t are determined. Second, the appropriate copula CFXt (X t),FWt (Wt) is selected
and estimated. We deploy the conditional copula in order to keep the time series
properties of the stochastic process
 
Wt

t∈N. For the simulation procedure, inde-
pendent [0, 1]-uniformly random variables Ut are needed. Note that the marginal
distribution functions are the same within a month m, i.e., FX i = FX j if i, j ∈ m. The
same holds for FWt , ht and CFXt (X t),FWt (Wt).
Based on Equations (4.5) and (4.6), the amount of hourly wind power produced by
a single turbine and the spot prices can be simulated. We sample from these model
equations using a Monte Carlo simulation (n = 10000) in order to investigate the
market value and revenue distributions as well as the relevance of the dependence
structure with the aggregated wind power for single turbines at different locations.
While the revenue is simply the sum of the products of electricity generation and
prices, the market value of a wind turbine is the average spot price weighted with
the electricity generation of the respective wind turbine:
MV =
∑
t X tSt∑
t X t
. (4.7)
In the following subsections, we explain the input parameters and the different parts
of the model in more detail.
4.3.1 The Data
Different data sets are deployed in order to calibrate and estimate the different parts
of the model. In the following, we explain the content and origin of these sets, as
well as the way in which the data are preprocessed.
Expected generation by the German aggregated wind power: For the estima-
tion of the appropriate copula (C) as well as for the supply and demand model
(represented by ht in Equation (4.5)), data is needed on the day-ahead expected
generation of the German aggregated wind power in 2011. This is provided by
the transmission system operators and published on the EEX Transparency Platform
(EEX Transparency Platform (2012)). Note that the day-ahead expectations – and
not the actual aggregated wind power – is used, since this is the relevant informa-
tion for the day-ahead market (Jónsson et al. (2010)).
Wind speeds: Hourly mean wind speeds for various measurement stations in Ger-
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many are provided via the national climate monitoring of the German Weather Ser-
vice for the years 1990-2011 (Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD) (2012)). The mea-
surement data for 19 locations are used in this project to determine the correspond-
ing power output series of wind turbines.7 Wind speeds are scaled to the hub height
of currently installed wind turbines (100 meters).8
Wind power capacities: The development of currently installed wind power capac-
ities per federal state between 1995 and 2011 is available from the German Wind
Energy Association (German Wind Energy Association (BWE) (2012)). In 2011,
installed wind power capacities in Germany amounted to 27.1 GW.
Electricity demand levels: Hourly electricity demand levels for the German market
in 2011 — used as one of the explaining variables for spot prices and denoted by
Dt in Equation (4.5) — are provided by ENTSO-E (2012).
Spot prices: EPEX day-ahead prices from 2011 are deployed for the calibration of
the spot price model (Equation (4.5)). The EPEX day-ahead market is organized
by an auctioning process that matches supply and demand curves once a day, thus
determining prices at which electricity is exchanged in each respective hour.
4.3.2 Derivation of Synthetic Aggregated Wind Power
As an important input for the model, curves are needed that describe the wind
power that the currently installed wind power capacities would have produced dur-
ing the last decades (i.e., the long-term stochastic behavior of aggregated wind
power in the power system). In the model, the curve is needed for the estimation
of the marginal distribution FW,t of the aggregated wind power Wt . It is important
to notice that this curve has to be derived synthetically, as wind power capacities
changed significantly during the last years.
Based on wind speeds and wind power capacities, the synthetic German aggregated
wind power is generated as follows: By applying a power curve capturing the char-
acteristics of the transformation process from wind energy to electrical power, elec-
tricity generation profiles of a wind turbine can be derived. In this study, the power
7Missing data are interpolated based on the previous and next available value if the missing gap is
not exceeding 12 hours. If the gap is longer, the values are replaced by data of the same station
and same hours of the previous year.
8As wind speeds are measured only a few meters above the ground, they are scaled to the hub height
of modern wind turbines (100 meters) assuming a power law: vh1 = vh0(h1/h0)
α, where h0 is the
measurement height, h1 the height of interest and α the shear exponent. According to Firtin et al.
(2011), α is assumed to be 0.14.
78
4.3 The Model
curve is assumed to be one of a GE 2.5 MW turbine (General Electric (2010)), that
represents a typical wind turbine. The transformation is based on a look-up table
derived from the power curve and linear interpolation. Furthermore, electrical out-
put is determined as a ratio of installed wind power capacity (i.e., scaled to [0,1]).
Multiplying this ratio with the wind power capacity installed in the corresponding
federal state yields the wind power. The above steps are repeated for 16 locations
(one for each federal state) and all available years (1990–2011), resulting in a time
series for what would have been produced during the last 22 years with current
wind power capacities. In order to check the plausibility of this approach, historical
wind power time series and volumes can be compared to the model estimates. The
comparison for the 2011 time series yields high conformity with an R2 of 0.84. An-
other check of consistency is done by calculating the accumulated aggregated wind
power volumes for the past 10 years from the synthetically generated curves, and
comparing them to the overall wind power as reported in Eurostat Database (2012).
We find the deviations to be less than 12%.
4.3.3 Supply- and Demand-Based Model for the Electricity Spot Price
We develop a supply- and demand-based model to derive electricity spot prices de-
pendent on the level of wind power. A similar approach has been applied in Burger
et al. (2006). The main difference between our and their approach is that we use
the residual demand instead of total demand. We are therefore able to integrate the
effect of wind power on spot prices.
We describe the non-linear relationship between residual demand and spot prices
(i.e., ht in Equation (4.5)) by a function estimated from historical hourly spot prices,
demand and wind power data. To derive a functional form for ht , we use spline fits
that are suitable to capture the non-linearities in the demand-price dependence.9
The parameters of ht are estimated from historical data for the reference year 2011
on a monthly basis in order to capture seasonal differences and variations on the
supply side that occur, e.g., because of planned outages or variations in fuel costs.
Note that if demand were totally price-inelastic, the function ht would approximate
the supply curve (excluding wind energy) that is often referred to as the merit
9A spline is a function that is constructed piece-wise from polynomial functions. It is smooth at the
places where the polynomial pieces connect (i.e., the knots) and aims at fitting a smooth curve to
a set of noisy observations. Based on the R2, we find cubic splines with three knots to be the best
configuration for our data.
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Figure 4.1: Demand-price dependence in February 2011 and spline fit
order.10 Even though electricity demand is generally very inelastic, there may be
some price-response of demand. Hence, our function ht should not be seen as an
unbiased estimator of the merit order. However, for our purpose the impact of
supply and residual demand elasticities on the observed market-clearing prices is
irrelevant as long as the elasticities of residual demand and supply do not vary with
changing wind power.11 The reason is that the wind power is the only quantity we
change in our simulation procedure.
The data and the corresponding spline fit for ht are shown in Figure 4.1 for the
month of February 2011. All other months of 2011 are presented in Figure 4.10 in
the Appendix. As can be observed, the dependence between residual demand levels
and prices is characterized by steep ends and a comparatively flat part in between
(i.e., for the residual demand ranging between 40 and 70 GW). Rather moderate
price increases in the upper tail may be interpreted by prevailing excess capacity in
the German power market, leading to very few instances at which scarcity prices
occur.
Besides the functional dependence on (residual) demand, additional stochastic fac-
tors influence spot market prices such as speculation, unplanned power plant out-
ages or scarcity prices. In the following, we aim at finding a model for Zt that is
capable of capturing the characteristics observed in the data. We can derive the
10I.e., the supply curve that represents all available sources of electricity generation ranked in ascend-
ing order of their short-run marginal generation costs.
11Note that we hereby assume that supply from conventional power plants and electricity demand
do not change with wind power. This assumption should not be critical since variations in the
conventional generation capacities can be assumed to remain equal within a month and we do not
change installed wind power capacities.
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observed residual short-term stochastic component based on ht , the observations
of residual demand and spot prices from zt = st − ht , and use the result for the
calibration of the stochastic process
 
Zt

t∈N. The time series zt is visually observed
to be stationary within the considered time frame, which is confirmed by an aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test that indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root can
be rejected at the 95% level.
The empirical auto-correlation function of zt decays slowly, however, with an appar-
ent dependence at a lag of 24 hours. We therefore choose to model Zt as a seasonal
ARIMA (SARIMA) model with 24 hour seasonality. In order to do so, the ARIMA
model needs to be extended to include non-zero coefficients at lag s, where s is
the identified seasonality period. We use a multiplicative form of SARIMA models,
resulting in a more parsimonious model than the additive option.12
As the Engle’s ARCH test indicates that there is conditional heteroscedasticity in the
data, we extend the SARIMA by a GARCH component. GARCH-type models are
able to capture conditional heteroscedasticity by splitting the error term εt into a
stochastic component ηt and a time-dependent standard deviation σt . The latter
can then be expressed dependent on lagged elements of ε and σt .
Various specifications of SARIMA-GARCH models are estimated and evaluated. Based
on the AIC, a GARCH(1,1)-SARIMA(2,0,2)×(1,0,1)24 model is found to perform
best. The inclusion of additional parameters hardly improves the fit. Note that no
constant needs to be added to the model of Zt due to the fact that the process has
already been centered by applying a spline fit.
Comparing the residual’s distribution to the normal distribution yields unsatisfac-
tory results (Figure 4.2, left hand side). Thus, alternatively, the error term can be
specified as a t-distribution, which leads to an improved match of the distributional
shapes (Figure 4.2, right hand side). Instead of ηt ∼ N (µ,σ2) we therefore use
ηt ∼ t(ν), with ν being the t-distribution’s degrees of freedom that are estimated
from the data.
12For more details about SARIMA models, the reader is referred to, e.g., Box et al. (2008).
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Figure 4.2: QQ-plots of the year 2011 residuals compared against a normal distribution and
a Student-t distribution
Written explicitly, the model for Zt now takes the following form:
Zt =φ1Zt−1+φ2Zt−2+Φ1Zt−24+Φ1(φ1Zt−25−φ2Zt−26) (4.8)
+ εt + θ1εt−1+ θ2εt−2+Θ1εt−24+Θ1(θ1εt−25− θ2εt−26)
εt =σtηt (4.9)
σ2t =α+ β1ε
2
t−1+ γ1σ2t−1 (4.10)
ηt ∼t(ν) (4.11)
The parameters for the above model are estimated from the time series zt by op-
timizing the log-likelihood function. Estimates and standard errors are presented
in Table 4.2. The estimates of Φ1 and Θ1 are particularly high, confirming the rel-
evance of the seasonal components. Furthermore, the coefficient of γ1 indicates
relatively persistent volatility clustering. Note that all standard errors are low with
respect to their estimates.
Table 4.2: Parameter estimates for the short-term stochastic process model
Parameter φ1 φ2 Φ1 θ1 θ2
Estimate 0.366 0.359 0.965 0.566 0.074
Std. Error (0.146) (0.120) (0.002) (0.146) (0.019)
Parameter Θ1 α β1 γ1 ν
Estimate -0.845 2.955 0.295 0.466 3.610
Std. Error (0.005) (0.032) (0.027) (0.272) (0.156)
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4.3.4 Estimation and Selection of Copula Models
In this section, we select and estimate models for the joint distribution of a single
turbine wind power and the German aggregated wind power for 19 wind power sta-
tions in Germany13. We apply the two-stage process introduced in Section 4.2: First,
the marginal distributions are determined, followed by the selection and estimation
of the copula model that best describes the dependence structure.
In order to determine the marginal distributions, we consider the hourly synthetic
wind power data for the years 1990–2011 for the different stations as well as for
the German aggregated wind power. The yearly data is split into monthly intervals
in order to capture seasonal differences. We thus obtain 22x12 subsamples from
which we get 22x12 empirical distribution functions. With 22 years, the data covers
a wide range of weather uncertainties that largely determine the quantity risk of
wind power. Furthermore, the extensive database allows us to use the empirical
distribution functions as marginal distribution functions (FWt , FX t ) of the two vari-
ables of interest, namely the single turbine wind power and the aggregated wind
power.
In contrast to the marginal distribution functions, the copula model CFXt (X t),FWt (Wt)
is estimated from the data of the day-ahead expected generation of the German
aggregated wind power in 2011 and the corresponding hourly single turbine wind
power. Even though 22 years would be available when using the synthetic aggre-
gated wind power, we argue that for estimating, the copula model it is important
to rely on observed rather than synthetically generated data. This is motivated as
follows: First, a source of imprecision would be incorporated due to the fact that
the synthetic aggregated wind power represents the actual power delivery, whereas
the day-ahead expected generation is the relevant quantity for the spot market ac-
tivities. Even though wind power forecasts have become more reliable over the last
years, we want to avoid this imprecision in the estimation of the copula models. Sec-
ond, subsamples consisting of approximately 700 observations are sufficiently large
for a reliable estimation of the copula parameters. Just as the empirical distribution
functions, the copula models are selected and estimated on a monthly basis.
To find the most appropriate copula model, various types are fitted to the data based
13We determine the models for the joint distribution functions between the German aggregated wind
power and the following stations: Aachen, Angermünde, Augsburg, Bremen, Dresden, Emden,
Erfurt-Weimar, Idar-Oberstein, Kahler Asten, Kleiner Feldberg, Konstanz, Leipzig-Halle, Magde-
burg, Münster-Osnabrück, Oldenburg, Potsdam, Rostock, Saarbrücken and Schleswig.
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on the procedure introduced in Section 4.2.1.14 Table 4.5 in Appendix 4.6 report
the copulas that provide the best fit to the data in terms of AIC for all stations that
are considered in this paper. In the following, we first concentrate on particular
stations (namely Bremen, Kleiner Feldberg and Augsburg) in order to point out the
most important aspects with respect to the dependence structure and the effect on
the results. Bremen is located in northern Germany where most of the current wind
capacity is installed due to generally high average wind speeds. Kleiner Feldberg is
a mountain in central Germany, also characterized by comparatively favorable wind
speeds but less surrounded by other wind turbines. Finally, we analyze Augsburg,
which is located in southern Germany and far away from most wind power capac-
ities. Augsburg has the fewest full load hours among the three stations considered.
Table 4.3 lists the copulas providing the best fit to the data (in terms of AIC) for
these three locations in every month.15 For Bremen and Augsburg, the copula that
provides the best fit in almost every month is the Gumbel copula. For these loca-
tions, there is a distinctive asymmetric upper tail dependence in the dependence
structure of the single turbine wind power and the aggregated wind power. In con-
trast, there is hardly any tail dependence for the turbine located at Kleiner Feldberg.
Here, most of the copulas that best fit the data are symmetric (Gaussian, Student-t
and Frank copula).
Table 4.3: Copula selection for the three stations of interest
Month Augsburg Bremen Kleiner Feldberg
January Gaussian T40 Gaussian
February Gumbel Gumbel Gaussian
March Gumbel Gumbel Frank
April Gumbel Gumbel Frank
May Gumbel Gumbel Frank
June Gumbel Gumbel Clayton
July Frank Gumbel Frank
August Gumbel Gumbel Frank
September Gumbel Gumbel T10
October Gumbel Gumbel Gaussian
November Gumbel Gumbel Frank
December Frank T10 Gaussian
Once the marginal distributions and copulas are estimated, the conditional copula
14The following copula models are tested: Gaussian copulas, Frank copulas, Clayton copulas, Gumbel
copulas and Student-t copulas for ν=1,2,3,4,5,10,20,30,40,50.
15The tables reporting the AIC values for all months and all copulas fitted to the data of the three
stations considered is provided in Appendix 4.6.
84
4.3 The Model
model can be used to simulate the single turbine wind power conditional on the
German aggregated wind power, based on the the sampling procedure that was
introduced in Section 4.2.2. We loop through the 22 years and the 12 months of
data and draw n= 10000 samples of the single turbine wind power for each point of
the aggregated wind power curve, while applying the corresponding single turbine
marginal distribution out of the 22x12 available.
Example: Figure 4.3 shows the dependence structure of the original data as well
as simulations from three different types of copula models for a wind turbine in
Bremen. Visually, the Gumbel copula provides the best fit to the data, which is con-
firmed by the comparison of the AIC. It can be observed that there is a distinctive
upper tail dependence between the single turbine wind power and the German ag-
gregated wind power. It should be noted that this type of dependence is generally
undesirable for wind turbines selling their electricity on the spot market, as there is
a high probability that spot prices are low in case of high electricity generation.
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Figure 4.3: Dependence structure of the original data and simulations from three copula
models
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Figure 4.4 shows the original data together with simulations from the Gumbel cop-
ula for the single turbine wind power located in Bremen and the aggregated wind
power, transformed back to their marginal distributions.16
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Figure 4.4: Observations and sample of the single turbine wind power and the aggregated
wind power
4.4 Results
This section presents the results of our simulation with respect to revenue distri-
butions and market values at different locations. In particular, we demonstrate the
relevance of the dependence structure for the market value in today’s context as
well as under higher wind power penetration levels.
Figure 4.5 presents the yearly revenue distribution for a wind turbine located in
Bremen selling its power at the spot market, together with the 5% value at risk.
The expected revenue amounts to 82000 Euro/MW/a, with a standard deviation of
3800 Euro/MW/a and a slightly negative skew. The 5% value at risk is found to be
75000 Euro/MW/a. Note that the distribution of absolute revenue is determined
by both the number of full load hours that can be achieved at the specific site of in-
terest and the corresponding market value. However, the scope of this paper lies on
the dependence structures of different sites and their impact on the market value,
as shown in the following analysis.
16The turbine is assumed to be a GE 2.5 MW.
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Figure 4.5: Yearly revenue distribution of the Bremen station and the 5% value-at-risk
4.4.1 Market Value of Different Wind Turbines
To quantify the effect arising from the dependence structures, distribution functions
of the market value are determined and compared for the three stations Augsburg,
Bremen and Kleiner Feldberg. Table 4.4 lists the main results for these three stations
for the month of February. The expected average spot price of the simulations is
48.52 Euro/MWh. In contrast, the expected market value of the wind turbines is
much lower for all turbines due to the dependence between the single turbine wind
power and the aggregated wind power, which in turn has a price damping effect.
From only the correlation coefficient ρ, one would have anticipated the expected
market value of a turbine in Augsburg (ρ = 0.37) to be much higher than the ex-
pected market value of a turbine in Kleiner Feldberg (ρ = 0.51) which in turn should
have a higher market value than a turbine in Bremen (ρ = 0.75). However, this is
not the case: Although the correlation coefficient for a turbine in Kleiner Feldberg is
much higher than that of a turbine in Augsburg, the expected market value is also
higher. The reason lies in the dependence structure. As shown in Section 4.3.4,
the dependence structure for Augsburg in February is best described by a Gumbel
copula, thus incorporating an upper tail dependence between the single turbine
wind power and the aggregated wind power. In contrast, the dependence struc-
ture between the single turbine wind power in Kleiner Feldberg and the aggregated
wind power is modeled most accurately by a symmetric Gaussian copula. Therefore,
87
4 Spatial Dependencies of Wind Power and Interrelations with Spot Price Dynamics
Kleiner Feldberg benefits from an advantageous dependence structure when selling
its wind power at the spot market.
Table 4.4: Main results for the month of February
Kleiner
Augsburg Bremen Feldberg
Expected average spot price [Euro/MWh] 48.52 48.52 48.52
Correlation coefficient 0.37 0.75 0.51
Selected copula model Gumbel Gumbel Gaussian
Expected market value [Euro/MWh] 43.10 41.31 44.33
Standard deviation [Euro/MWh] 5.98 6.63 5.63
The distributions of the yearly market value for the three stations considered are
shown in Figure 4.6. Following the same logic as discussed for the specific month of
February, the yearly market value of a turbine in Kleiner Feldberg is higher than the
market value for Augsburg. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the dependence structure
for Augsburg is modeled with a copula incorporating an upper tail dependence in
almost every month, whereas the one for Kleiner Feldberg is mostly symmetric. Con-
sequently, for the three distributions that are shown in Figure 4.6, the dependence
structure reduces the expected yearly market value of the turbines by 3.54, 4.97
and 2.63 Euro/MWh, respectively, compared to the expected average spot price
level (49.80 Euro/MWh).
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Figure 4.6: Yearly market value of the three turbines
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4.4.2 Market Value Variations in Germany
Germany is characterized by a surface area of 357,021 km2 and a maximum hori-
zontal width and vertical length of 642 km and 833 km, respectively. Furthermore,
there are several diverse geographical regions, suggesting that meteorological con-
ditions may vary substantially when analyzing different locations throughout the
country.
With the model developed, we analyze the market value for 19 different stations
in Germany, as depicted in Figure 4.7. As the analyzed stations differ with respect
to their exact location (and thus with respect to their dependence structure related
to the aggregated German wind power), we expect market values to differ as well.
Specifically, we expect the market value to be lowest for the stations that are closest
to the majority of installed wind power capacities. Figure 4.7 shows the expected
market value of the stations that were considered.
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Figure 4.7: Expected yearly market value for 19 stations in Germany (in Euro/MWh)
Results indicate that the expected market value ranges from 42 to 48 Euro/MWh
for the analyzed stations, compared to an expected average spot price level of 49.80
89
4 Spatial Dependencies of Wind Power and Interrelations with Spot Price Dynamics
Euro/MWh. Hence, the market value lies between 6 and 15% lower than the av-
erage spot price. As expected, lowest values are found for the stations that are
closest to the majority of currently installed wind power capacities, i.e., mainly in
the area of Magdeburg and Münster-Osnabrück. For stations in this area, the de-
pendence structure shows a pronounced asymmetric upper tail dependence. It is
observed that expected market values are similar for all stations located in the so
called ’North German Plain’, which is a geographical region in Northern Germany
characterized by constant lowlands and hardly any hills. Note that Aachen is at the
far end of the North German Plain and, as such, equally characterized by compara-
tively low expected market values of 43.47 Euro/MWh. In contrast, Kahler Asten is
located in Germany’s Central Uplands, where meteorological conditions are differ-
ent (e.g., due to pronounced thermals), which is reflected by higher values. Other
stations in or south of the Central Uplands show higher expected market values as
there are very few installed wind power capacities.
Kahler Asten and Kleiner Feldberg are special cases, as they are characterized by ad-
vantageous, symmetric dependence structures, resulting in expected market values
that are the highest compared to the other stations considered. Similarly, Emden
and Rostock – both located at the seashore – show higher values, compared to other
stations in the North German Plain, due to comparatively advantageous dependence
structures.
4.4.3 The Impact of Changing Wind Power Penetration Levels
In the previous section, model parameters were set and estimated to reflect the
current environment with respect to the physical generation mix and the market
conditions. In this section, some of the model parameters are modified to analyze
their impact on the outcome. As has been clarified, the effect of wind power on spot
market prices largely depends on the quantities of wind power being integrated in
the market. With the help of the model presented in this paper, the aforementioned
effect is quantified for the case of changing wind power penetration levels in Ger-
many. First, we scale up the wind power penetration up to two times the capacity
that is currently installed. Note that this is roughly in line with targets envisaged
by the German government, which wants to further extend wind power to 45.8 GW
in 2020 (installed capacity was 27.1 GW in 2011). Second, we compare the impact
of today’s wind power penetration to a situation with no wind power capacities in-
stalled. For the analysis, installed wind power capacities are scaled-up stepwise and
simulation runs are repeated for each of these steps. The underlying assumptions
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of this approach are as follows:
• The proportionate geographic distribution of wind power capacities within
Germany remains the same. Note that due to the linear up-scaling, the depen-
dence structure is preserved. Alternatively, region-specific changes in installed
capacities could be implemented, e.g., for testing the effect of an increased
wind power extension in some specific area.
• The functional dependence between residual demand levels and spot prices
is again estimated from 2011 data, as explained in Section 4.3.3. This is
certainly a strong assumption, as the conventional power sector will dynami-
cally develop with increasing wind power penetration. However, it should be
kept in mind that current wind power capacities are being rapidly expanded,
whereas the conventional power sector seems to be behind in terms of ca-
pacity adjustments. Also note that the functional dependence could also be
altered (e.g., by shifting or assuming a different shape). However, this was
not implemented in order to focus on the specific impact of the wind power
penetration levels.
• The parameter estimates for the short-term stochastic spot price process re-
main the same. Here again, the model could be adjusted in order to represent
expectations regarding future short-term stochastic price movements.
The resulting distributions of the yearly market value for the station of Bremen under
increasing wind power penetration ranging from 100-200% are shown in Figure
4.8. As can be observed, the local market value distribution is highly affected both
in average level and variance. While the expected local market value is at 44.83
Euro/MWh at 100% scaling, it decreases to 30.13 Euro/MWh at a scaling of 200%.
At the same time, its standard deviation increases from 1.94 to 3.40 Euro/MWh,
respectively.
To achieve further insights regarding the effect of the wind power penetration level,
we repeat the simulation for all three stations considered in Section 4.4.1 and a
wind penetration level ranging from 0-200%. The relative change in expected val-
ues of the resulting market value distributions are presented in Figure 4.9. For
completeness, the expected average spot price level is also included. Compared
to an expected average spot price of 56.70 Euro/MWh at 0% scaling, the level is
reduced by 12% to 49.80 Euro/MWh for today’s penetration level. Hence, pro-
vided that the rest of the system remains the same, the spot price level would be 7
Euro/MWh higher with no wind power penetration. In this case, resulting market
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Figure 4.8: Yearly market value of the Bremen station under increasing wind power
penetration
values are above average spot price levels (due to higher wind power infeeds dur-
ing wintertime when overall demand as well as prices tend to be also higher) and
almost equal for any single wind turbine as spot prices are only marginally affected
by wind power. Just as average spot price levels, expected market values decrease
as the penetration level increases, however, at very different slopes. Whereas the
average spot price itself is affected the least, the expected market value decreases
corresponding to their dependence structure. They drop below average spot price
levels at penetration levels as low as around 30% of today’s capacities. A scaling
of 100% corresponds to the current situation described in detail in Section 4.4.1.
As can be observed, the difference between the average spot price and the market
value further increases as the scaling factor approaches 200%, reaching levels of
8.34, 11.63, and 6.20 Euro/MWh for Augsburg, Bremen and Kleiner Feldberg, re-
spectively.
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Figure 4.9: Relative change in expected values of the spot price and the market value under
changing wind power penetration levels
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4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to derive the value of wind power at different
locations. In particular, the impact of the dependence structure of wind power
on its value has been analyzed. This analysis becomes increasingly important as
shares of wind power in electricity markets rise. We therefore developed a model
for the simulation of single turbine wind power and electricity spot prices, including
a precise representation of their interrelations. Copula theory has been applied
to model single turbine wind power and aggregated wind power, thus allowing
us to decouple their dependence structure from their marginal distributions. The
formation of prices has been formulated as a function of the aggregated wind power
in a supply- and demand-based model. As such, the model extends formerly known
modeling approaches through its ability to simulate and quantify the price effect of
wind power and hence to determine market values.
We find that the market value highly depends on the specific location and the corre-
sponding dependence structure between the wind power of a single turbine at this
location and the aggregated wind power. Whereas most locations are found to be
characterized by rather adverse asymmetric dependence structures, some of the lo-
cations analyzed are identified as being related to the aggregated wind power such
that their realizable selling prices are comparatively high. For the nineteen locations
in Germany that we have analyzed in detail, we have shown that the expected mar-
ket value is reduced by up to 8 Euro/MWh compared to average spot price levels
and varies by up to 6 Euro/MWh for the different locations.
Moreover, our results indicate that, in case of increasing wind power capacities, the
adverse upper tail dependence structure of many locations has a negative impact
on the market value, which makes market integration of wind power even more
difficult. Nevertheless, integrating wind power into the market would allow market
prices to reveal their key function by indicating the actual value of electricity and
thus triggering investments in wind power projects characterized by high realiz-
able spot prices. These projects would deploy balancing potentials much better and
reduce the volatility in the electricity spot market as well as in the physical system.
Although a powerful tool to analyze the market value of wind power in a predefined
setting, the model reveals its limitations in not being able to determine the dynamic
reaction of the power system development in response to changing levels of wind
power penetration. Further research could be done by extending the model in order
to use it as a forecasting and derivative pricing tool, or by applying the modeling
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approach developed in this paper to other forms of renewable energy, e.g., solar
power.
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Figure 4.10: Demand-price dependence and spline fits for all months of the year 2011
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